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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

NATURAL RESOURCE, REGIONAL GROWTH, AND HUMAN CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION
The dissertation research will comprise three essays on the topic of the resource curse
hypothesis and its mechanisms. The phenomenon of low economic growth in resourcerich regions is recognized as the “resource curse”. These essays will contribute to an
understanding of the regional resource-growth relation within a nation.
Essay one tests the resource curse hypothesis at the U.S. state level. With a system of
equations model, I decompose the overall resource effect to account for the two leading
explanations — crowding-out and institution effects, thus investigate whether the
institutions mediate the crowding-out effects. I did not find evidence of an overall
negative effect on growth by resource wealth. Both the crowding-out and institution
appear present, but they offset: the resource boom crowds out industrial investments, but
good institutions mitigate the overall effect. Resources do reduce growth in states with
low-quality institutions, including Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.
Essay two compares the effects of resource revenues on the economic growth and
growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and American states, using panel data
from 1990 to 2015. With the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, I show that regions with
higher resource revenues grow faster than other regions in both China and the U.S. The
positive resource effect is larger and more statistically significant in the U.S. Further
testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price reform,
the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market price
reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the positive
resource effect in China. Though strong and positive resource – growth relations appear
in both countries, evidence also suggests consistent negative resource effects on certain
growth-related factors in both countries, such as educational attainments and R&D
activities.
Essay three explores the schooling response to the oil and gas boom, taking advantage of
timing and spatial variation in oil and gas well drilling activities. Development of costreducing technologies at the time of higher crude oil and natural gas prices in the early

2000s has accelerated shale oil and gas extraction in the United States. I show that
intensive drilling activities have decreased grade 11 and 12 enrollment over the 14 year
study window − approximately 36 fewer students per county on average and overall,
41,760 fewer students across the 15 states enrolled considered in the analysis. On
average, with one additional oil or gas well drilled per thousand initial laborers, grade 11
and 12 enrollment would decrease 0.24 percent at the county level, all else equal. I
investigate heterogeneous effects and show that the implied effect of the boom is larger in
states with a younger compulsory schooling age requirement (16 years of age instead of
17 or 18), lower state-level effective tax rate on oil and gas productions, traditional
mining, non-metro, and persistent poverty counties.
KEYWORDS: Resource Curse, Economic Growth, the United States, China, Energy
Boom, High School Enrollment
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Many economically important commodities could be described as natural resources –
land, oil, coal, ores, fish populations, and so on. Economic growth depends on production
factors, such as capital, labor, and natural resources. However, does resource wealth
promote economic development? Counter-intuitively, some of the fastest growing
economies over recent decades are regions with little natural wealth, whereas some
countries with enormous resources suffer from poor economic performance, such as
Angola, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The phenomenon that resourcerich regions develop less quickly, called the resource curse, was formally presented by
Auty in 1993 and has become “one of the most intriguing puzzles in economic
development and a great example of how organized empirical observations can guide
economic theory and inform policy” (James and Aadland, 2011 pp440).
Empirical tests of the resource curse hypothesis started with cross-country studies and
led to no consensus conclusions. Some economists observed the resource curse as a
general phenomenon in a large sample of countries from the 1960s to 2000s (Sachs and
Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; et al.) while others have refuted the resource
curse hypothesis (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; et al.). It is not surprising that effects
of natural resources on the economy vary from country to country and across different
episodes in history. However, the inconsistent empirical results could also reflect biases
lying in cross-country analyses. Country-level observations offer significant variations in
resource endowments, and economic growths, which facilitate the analysis. Yet many
1

confounding features, such as geography, culture, and institution quality, also exist and
could potentially bias the results, especially in cross-sectional analysis. The concern
persists with panel-data given the time-varying hard-to-measure factors like
macroeconomic policies. To address concerns in cross-country studies, this dissertation
exploits variation within a country, where variables that might confound the relationship
between resources and macroeconomic outcomes do not vary and the danger of spurious
correlation is minimized.
Two main explanations for the resource curse have been proposed. The crowding-out
effect suggests that resource wealth crowds out growth-inducing factors such as
investment, human capital, innovation and so on. The institution effect argues that
whether resource wealth is a curse or not depends on the governance quality in the
resource-rich region. Good institutions mediate the potential curse. Both explanations
have been supported by empirical work (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999 and 2001;
Mehlum et al., 2006; Michaels, 2011; Boschini et al., 2013). In literature, the crowdingout effect and the institution effect have been tested separately or not at all. In Chapter
two, this gap is addressed by decomposing the resource effect into direct effect,
crowding-out effect, and institution effect in the U.S.
Regional level analyses reduce the danger of spurious correlations by analyzing
subnational regions facing the same economic system, institution arrangement,
macroeconomic policies, and less various cultures and institutional qualities. The tradeoff
is to forgo opportunities of testing impacts from persistent features, such as the economic
system and institution arrangement. Chapter three explores the role of economic systems
in the resource – growth relation with a comparison analysis between China and the U.S.

2

Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies have induced an oil and gas
drilling boom in the U.S. since the 2000s. Oil and gas extraction has rapidly increased
from shale formations. Comparing to conventional gas deposits which are in permeable
rocks typically located much closer to the surface, the shale deposits are trapped in finegrained sedimentary rocks with very low permeability and located 1,000 to 13,500 feet
below the surface (Joskow 2013). According to U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA), hydraulic fracturing (commonly called "fracking" or "fracing") is a technique in
which water, chemicals, and sand are pumped into the well to unlock the hydrocarbons
trapped in shale formations by opening cracks (fractures) in the rock and allowing natural
gas to flow from the shale into the well. When used in conjunction with horizontal
drilling, hydraulic fracturing enables gas producers to extract shale gas economically.
Simply, fracking is to produce natural gas from shale rock by bombarding it with water
and chemicals.
The increase in oil and gas related employment is the other side of the shale gas boom.
Many new jobs related to the energy boom are task-skill based – meaning that education
and work experience requirements for entry are low – and have the potential to raise the
opportunity cost of schooling significantly. During energy boom periods, increased
demand for and earnings of task-skill labor with low education requirements could widen
the wage differential and increase the opportunity cost of staying in school, thus drawing
teenagers out of school (Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005b; Emery, Ferrer and Green
2012). Chapter four exploits variation in timing and spatial patterns of oil and gas well
drilling activities across 15 American states since the 2000s to investigate the schooling
impact of the rent shale oil and gas boom.

3

1.2. Objectives and Structure
The objectives of this dissertation are four-fold. The first is to test the resource curse
hypothesis within the U.S. and China. Second, investigate the mechanisms, e.g. the
crowding-out effect and the institution effect, in the U.S. to shed light on the meditation
strategies to the “cursed” regions. Then compare the U.S. and China case to draw insights
on how the distinct economic systems could alter the resource – growth relation. Finally,
take advantage of the shale oil and gas boom in the U.S. and investigate the impact of
resource booms on schooling decisions.
Chapter two tests whether a resource curse exists in the U.S. and further decomposing
the resource effect into direct effect, crowding-out effect, and institution effect. A panel
data set of 50 states from 1997 to 2014 with a system of equations model. It contributes
to the literature with the decomposition of the overall resource effect thus investigates the
two mechanisms simultaneously.
Chapter three uses comparable measures to examine the effects of resource revenues
on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and
American states from 1990 to 2015. For economies in transition, such as China, weak
price signals and prevailing state ownership likely lead to inefficient resource allocation,
leaving a weak or even negative resource-growth relation. The main goal of this chapter
is to illustrate this argument using comparative regional-level analysis of the resource
wealth impacts in China and the United States. It contributes to the literature with the first
comparison piece between Chinese provinces and the U.S. states on testing the resourcegrowth relation. Several resource-related policies during the study period in China, such
as the market price reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy,
4

provide variations in China’s transition to a market economy. To the best of my
knowledge, this is also the first study in the China literature to link and empirically test
impacts of market price reforms and the fiscal reform in the resource-growth relation.
Chapter four exploits county and year variation in drilling activities across 1170
counties in 15 oil and gas production states in the U.S. between 2000 and 2013. The
instrumental variable approach with various fixed effects provides estimates of how this
recent oil and gas boom affected high school enrollment at the county level. It improves
the literature by drawing on rich well drilling data at an annual frequency that both
identifies the location, timing, and intensity of the oil and gas boom and allows me to
explore heterogeneous effects. Chapter five closes the dissertation discussing conclusions
and applications.
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Chapter 2 Do Institutions Mediate the Crowding-out Effects? The Resource Curse
Revisited at the U.S. State Level
2.1. Introduction
Economic growth depends on production factors, such as capital, labor, and natural
resources. However, does resource wealth promote economic development? Counterintuitively, some of the fastest growing economies over recent decades are regions with
little natural wealth, whereas some countries with enormous resources suffer from poor
economic performance, such as Angola, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The phenomenon that resource-rich regions develop less quickly, called the resource
curse, was formally presented by Auty in 1993 and has become “one of the most
intriguing puzzles in economic development and a great example of how organized
empirical observations can guide economic theory and inform policy” (James and
Aadland, 2011 pp440).
Two main explanations for the resource curse have been proposed. The crowding-out
effect suggests that resource wealth crowds out growth-inducing factors such as
investment, human capital, innovation and so on. The institution effect argues that
whether resource wealth is a curse or not depends on the governance quality in the
resource-rich region. Good institutions mediate the potential curse. Both explanations
have been supported by empirical work (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999 and 2001;
Mehlum et al., 2006; Michaels, 2011; Boschini et al., 2013).
While the resource curse literature began with cross-country analysis, within-country
evidence has also emerged (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Corey, 2009; Weber, 2013).
However, the crowding-out effect and the institution effect have been tested separately or
6

not at all. In this study, I address this gap in the literature by investigating whether a
resource curse exists in the U.S. and further decomposing the resource effect into direct
effect, crowding-out effect, and institution effect. I analyze a panel data set of 50 states
from 1997 to 2014 with a system of equations model and find that both the crowding-out
effect and the institution mediation contribute to the resource-growth relation, but that the
net resource effect is positive or neutral. In other words, I did not find evidence of a
general resource curse for U.S. states and good institutions do mediate the crowding-out
effect. The results are robust to different institution measures, model specifications, and
econometric approaches. To my best knowledge, this study is the first attempt to test both
effects simultaneously. A system of equations model with both state and year fixed
effects allows me to test various resource effects systematically, and further addresses
the endogeneity due to time-invariant omitted variables and the simultaneous comovements among macro-variables at the U.S. state level.
2.2. Literature Review
2.2.1. Resource Curse across countries
Are natural resources a curse or a blessing? The empirical evidence is diverse: some
economists observed the resource curse as a general phenomenon in a large sample of
countries from the 1960s to 2000s (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and Gerlagh,
2004; et al.). However, others have refuted the resource curse hypothesis
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; et al.). In fact, the same author could claim two
opposing views in different studies: Bulte et al. (2005) used resource exports over total
exports as a proxy for resource abundance and found that resource-intensive countries
tend to suffer lower levels of human development. However, with a similar sample and
7

time frame, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) claimed that the resource curse might be a
red herring because the commonly used measure of “resource abundance” is a proxy for
“resource dependence,” which is endogenous to underlying structural factors. Using total
natural capital and subsoil assets as measures, they found that resource abundance
positively affects growth. As summarized in Van der Ploeg (2011), the effects of natural
resources on the economy vary from country to country and across different episodes in
history.
2.2.2. Are resources a curse? Crowding-out effect and institutions
Economists have developed two main mechanisms to explain the resource curse: the
crowding-out effect and the institution explanation. (See Van der Ploeg, 2011)
Crowding-out can be summarized as resource abundance reducing activity X, where X
drives growth. Different crowding-out stories focus on different X activities. Sachs and
Warner (1995, 1999, and 2001) applied a Dutch Disease model, in which X is the
manufacture of traded goods. The extra wealth generated by the sale of natural resources
induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate so that natural resource windfalls cause
deindustrialization (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). This model assumes that
learning by doing in the manufacturing sector is the key driver of growth. Other growthdriving activities that may be crowded out by natural resource wealth include education
(Gylfason, 2001; Stijns, 2006), knowledge creation (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004), and
investment (Beck, 2011).
No matter which X factors are examined, the crowding-out explanation suggests that
the problem lies in resources themselves: the production function of the resource sector is
inferior due to lack of knowledge accumulation (Sachs and Warner, 1995) or fewer
8

backward or forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958). Though a resource boom brings out
higher returns at first, it drags the economy into a lower growth path in the long run. This
explanation, however, does not explain notable counter-examples, such as Norway and
Botswana.
The institution explanation suggests that whether resources are blessed or cursed
depends on the quality of institutions. Mehlum et al. (2006a, 2006b) modeled a resourceabundant economy with an allocation of entrepreneurial activity between production and
grabbing (i.e., rent-seeking), affected by the quality of institutions. They used Sachs and
Warner’s dataset to test the institution explanation and concluded that institutions are
decisive for the effect of resources. Boschini et al. (2007 and 2013) also concluded that
mineral-rich countries are cursed only if they have low-quality institutions (e.g.,
dysfunctional legal system and low transparency).
Further, resource revenues may encourage bad institutional practices, such as imperfect
markets, poorly functioning legal systems, buying off the opposition, or overspending on
public service employment (Gelb, 1988; Auty, 2001a; Ross, 1999; Brunnschweiler and
Bulte, 2008). In particular, point resources (e.g., minerals and fossil fuels) generate
concentrated production and revenue patterns, which are more likely to be controlled by
relatively small groups of society, exhibiting so-called “executive discretion in revenue
allocation” (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). Murshed (2004) argued that point resources
(e.g., agriculture, forestry) tend to breed rent-seeking behaviors and harm political
institutions, while diffuse resources are better, and manufactured goods are the best for
the development of good governance institutions. In contrast, Tompson (2005) studied
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the political implications of Russia’s resource-based economy and concluded that
attribution of Russia’s politics to its resource-based economy was unconvincing.
The preceding argument lies in the crowding-out camp even though it also recognized
institutions as the crucial link. With the crowding-out effect, institutional quality is
another growth-driving factor X that is retarded by resource abundance, whereas the
institution explanation focuses on ex-ante institutional quality. In this latter narrative,
resource rents could either be captured by interest groups for personal enrichment or be
allocated into a productive economy, and the choice depends on institutional qualities.
Indeed, the source of the windfall (e.g., natural resources or foreign aid) is irrelevant—it
is a revenue curse due to bad institutions rather than a resource curse (Morrison, 2010).
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, and Botswana are all examples of
countries in which strong institutions have made resource abundance a blessing, rather
than a curse (Acemoglu et al., 2003).
2.2.3. Within-country variation on resource curse
Subnational studies of the resource curse take advantage of less variation in factors that
might confound the relationship between resources and macroeconomic outcomes,
reducing the danger of spurious correlations. At the U.S. state level, both Papyrakis and
Gerlagh (2007) and Corey (2009) confirmed the resource curse, but the former explained
it with crowding-out effects and the latter supported the institution explanation. At the
U.S. county level, Michaels (2011) showed evidence that oil abundance increased local
employment in both the mining and manufacturing sectors and that the South’s oil
endowment helped to overcome its slow start, rather than impede its growth, compared to
the North’s. Weber (2013) reached a similar conclusion on natural gas development since
10

2000. However, James and Aadland (2011) investigated 3,092 U.S. counties and showed
clear evidence of a resource curse.
Factor mobilities are higher within a country than across countries. The spatial
equilibrium model suggests that people “vote with their feet” and that high income can be
interpreted as compensation for negative site-specific attributes (Roback, 1982; Glaeser
and Gottlieb, 2008). As a result, income may not be a good proxy for state or local
wellbeing. Change in employment, population, and poverty rate are used as alternative
measures (Weber 2012 and 2013; Partridge et al., 2013). Spatial modeling is further
applied to consider other neighbor effects within a country (Weber 2013). In this study, I
focus on the growth rate of state per capita income, to be consistent with the original
resource curse hypothesis proposed by Auty and make results comparable to the
literature. I further check the robustness with alternative dependent variables like state
population growth and additional spatial analyses.
I contribute to the literature by using U.S. state-level panel data in a system of
equations to test the resource curse hypothesis. I decompose the overall resource impact
into the direct effect, the crowding-out effect, and the institution effect, thus investigating
the two mechanisms simultaneously. At the county level, the lack of data on institution
proxies prevents investigation of the institution explanation. At the state level, previous
studies have independently tested the two mechanisms. Also, these studies rely on crosssectional data, whereas my use of panel data models can control for state-specific effects,
thus reducing omitted variable bias.
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2.3. Empirical Model and Data
The empirical analyses aim to test the resource curse hypothesis at the U.S. state level
and its two mechanisms, the crowding-out effect, and the institution effect.
2.3.1. Resource wealth and growth
A system of equations is proposed to identify and decompose the resource-growth
relation:
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (1)

𝐗𝐗 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛂𝛂0 + 𝛂𝛂1 ln(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛂𝛂2 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐒𝐒𝑖𝑖 + 𝐓𝐓𝑡𝑡 + 𝛍𝛍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

(2)

Subscripts i and t indicate state and time, respectively. Equation (1) implements the

income convergence growth model in the growth and resource curse literature (e.g.,
Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995
and 1999a; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004 and 2007; et al.). G is annual growth in real per
capita income, and Inc is annual real per capita income. The natural log of per capita
income with one period lag (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ) controls for the initial income level and a
negative 𝛽𝛽1 would imply conditional income convergence in growth. R is resource

wealth. The interaction term between resource wealth and institutional quality

(Institution) identifies the institution effect (Mehlum et al., 2006a and 2006b; Boschini et
al., 2013): the marginal effect of natural resources on growth is conditional on the level
of institutional quality, given by (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). A positive 𝛽𝛽3 signals that a

sufficiently high level of the institutional quality can offset the potentially negative 𝛽𝛽2,

thus break the curse. I call it the institution effect. X is a matrix of growth-related

variables including investment, human capital, and R&D. 𝛃𝛃′ is the vector of coefficients

on different growth-related variables aforementioned. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a state-specific fixed effect for
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each state i. 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 is the dummy variable for year, which allows for nationwide shocks and
growth trends over time not otherwise accounted for by the explanatory variables.

The crowding-out effect was tested by regressing growth-friendly factors (X) on the
resource variable as specified in equation (2) (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and
Gerlagh, 2007; Shao and Qi, 2009). Since matrix X consists of three vectors: investment,
human capital, and R&D intensity, (1) and (2) constitute a system of four equations. A
negative α2 implies that factor 𝑋𝑋 decreases with the resource abundance level so that x is

crowded-out by resources.

To test crowding-out and institution effects systematically and fully identify the
resource-growth relation, I substitute equation (2) into equation (1) and obtain the
reduced form equation (3):
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛄𝛄′𝛍𝛍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
(3)

Where 𝛾𝛾0 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂0 ;
𝛾𝛾1 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂1 ;

𝛾𝛾2 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 ;
𝛾𝛾3 = 𝛽𝛽3;

𝛄𝛄′ = 𝛃𝛃′

Both 𝛃𝛃′ and 𝛂𝛂 are vectors of coefficients and 𝛍𝛍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of residuals from equation

(2). Finally, the overall marginal effect of natural resources on growth is given by
equation (4):
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,
2
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
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(4)

Four testable hypotheses are parameterized in equation (4). The general resource curse
would be reflected by a negative coefficient for the overall impact of resource wealth on
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

growth ( 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕). This impact is decomposed into three effects: the direct effect (𝛽𝛽2 ), the

crowding-out effects (𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 ), and the institution effect (𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ). While

theory has not suggested a specific sign on the direct effect 𝛽𝛽2, a negative 𝛂𝛂2 multiplying
a positive 𝛃𝛃′ implies a crowding-out effect on growth-inducing factors, and a positive 𝛽𝛽3
signals the institution effect that mediates any potential negative effect. The overall

resource effect depends on the sign, magnitude, and significance of all three effects. The
decomposition differentiates this study from other empirical specifications. The resource
curse literature either estimated equation (1) only and tested the direct and the institution
effect, or investigated the crowding-out mechanism without the interaction between
resource wealth and institutional quality (e.g. Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004 and 2007).
The system of equations model allows me to decompose the overall resource effects and
test both effects simultaneously.
A system of equations with panel data can be estimated with single equation approach,
such as applying panel estimators (e.g. Fixed Effect), equation-by-equation, or with
system estimators such as three-stage least squares (3SLS). The single equation approach
assumes that (i) all regressors are exogenous, and (ii) correlations among errors in the
system are zero. When these assumptions are likely to be violated, 3SLS allows
correlation among errors and endogenous regressors. I report the results of both
approaches. State and year fixed effects are controlled in each equation. With the 3SLS
estimator, the system is identified with both included and excluded instruments. The
included instruments are natural log of real per capita personal income with a one-year
14

lag, resource wealth with a one-year lag, ex-ante institutional quality measures, state and
year dummies. Moreover, two-year lagged investment, human capital, and R&D density
are employed as excluded instruments 1. In addition to my main analysis, I report a
number of diagnostic tests following the 3SLS regression, and I further check robustness
by employing alternative econometric approaches incorporating dynamic and spatial
dimensions. These results are discussed in Section 2.5.
2.3.2. Justification for the covariates and the measure
2.3.2.1.

Measuring resource wealth

Table 1 lists variable definitions and descriptive statistics. In my baseline analysis, my
measure of resource wealth is Resource_point, which is the share of gross state product
(GSP) derived from the extraction of point resource (i.e., mining sector). According to
the literature, point resources are more likely to contribute to the resource curse (Jensen
and Wantchekon, 2004; Murshed, 2004). However, I also examine alternative measures:
Resource_diffuse is the GSP share from the extraction of the diffuse resource (i.e.,
agriculture, fishing, and forestry), while Resource_oil&gas, Resource_coal&metal, and
Resource_supportactivities are measures that further segment the GSP share from point
resources. In the 2000s, the U.S. has experienced large increases in the extraction of oil
and natural gas from shale, while coal extraction has declined. Analysis of the last two

1
Ideally, I would like one unique explanatory variable for each of the three equations in (2) to obtain
sufficient exclusion restrictions. However, under the specification with both state and year fixed effects,
explanatory power is already very high for the investment, human capital and R&D equations (R2 are all
above 90%). The panel setting (i.e., annual variation) makes it difficult to obtain such explanatory
variables. Thus I apply two-year lagged investment, human capital, and R&D expenditure as excluded
instruments, and they all pass various diagnostic tests as discussed in the text.
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measures allows me to consider the effects of this trend and the differing technologies
associated with these different resources.
These variables are flow measures equivalent to the share of natural resources in
export or GDP in cross-countries studies (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Mehlum et al., 2006a
and 2006b; Boschini et al., 2013). Other studies have employed stock measures such as
the share of natural capital in total capital or the value of subsoil assets (Alexeev and
Conrad, 2009, Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Gylfason, 2001; Hodler, 2006). I agree
that it is important to distinguish between resource “endowments” (e.g., the stock
measures) and resource “dependency” (e.g., the flow measures) 2. I also agree that stock
measures suffer fewer problems with endogeneity 3. However, I believe that it is when
resources come into the production process and the resource rents are realized that they
are most likely to influence growth. Unexploited resources may connect with economic
performance tenuously. As Boschini et al. (2013) pointed out, when politicians face some
trade-off between grabbing the resources today or developing other sectors in expecting
more future gains, or when an individual choose to work in the booming resource sector
rather than investing in education, “it is the share that resources makeup of the economy
at the point of deciding that matters” (page 21).
Regardless of these important aspects, flow measures may be viewed as conditionally
exogenous. First, mining activity is highly related to resource availability, which is

2

The distinction was first made in Stijins (2005) and later developed by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008).
As van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) pointed out, resource reserve measures are not necessarily
exogenous since countries that have long been industrialized or with better institutions are more likely to
have explored and found more of their reserves. In the subnational case though, reserves across a country
seem more exogenous due to homogeneous exploration technology across states.

3
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geologically exogenous 4. Second, the main criticism of flow measures in the literature is
that economic policies and institutions may influence resource dependency. For example,
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) suggested that sectoral lobbying can alter policies. In
some studies (e.g., Weber, 2013), this endogeneity is addressed by use of geological
instruments, such as the percent of the region covering an oil or gas formation, but this
approach is precluded by my use of state fixed effects. Instead, I check the sensitivity of
my results to endogeneity with the Added Controls Approach (ACA) by including
proxies for lobbying and rent-seeking behaviors. These results are discussed in Section
2.5.
2.3.2.2.

Measuring institutional quality

Several aspects of institutions have been studied in the resource curse context. One
division is between “rules” and “institutional outcomes” (Boschini et al., 2013) 5. Rules
refer to constraints on governance or the executive, such as constitutional arrangements,
the degree of democracy, or trade restrictions. Institutional outcomes, in contrast, reflect
government actions. In cross-country studies, scholars have employed several standard
indices to indicate both sides of institutional quality 6. In my study, measures of
institutional “rules” are unlikely to show much variation across U.S. states. I, therefore,

4

In fact, many studies has employed exogenous geological factors to instrument resource dependence
(Weber, 2012 and 2013; Borge et al., 2013), which suggests that most part of the resource production is
exogenous and related to the exogenous resource availability rather than other factors.
5
In the same line, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) differentiate between institutions as “durable
constraints” and “changeable policy outcomes”. In the institution literature but not the resource curse
context, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) distinguish between economic and political institutions, capturing a
similar point. Also see Glaeser et al. (2004) and Persson (2005)
6
Indicators for “institution rules” include the degree of democracy from Polity IV data set (Murshed,
2004); for “institutional outcomes” include rule of law and government effectiveness measured by the
World Bank (Bulte et al., 2005), various country risk indices from the International Country Risk Guide
(Mehlum et al., 2004; Boschini et al., 2007; et al.) and transparency (Williams, 2011).
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focus on the “institutional outcomes” dimension. Based on literature and available data, I
use four indices of institutional quality: a constructed government efficiency index,
public official corruption convictions, the score of state liability systems by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and the Economic Freedom of North America Index (EFNA) by
the Fraser Institute. I use the first measure in my baseline analysis, and investigate the
institution effect in detail with all four proxies.
For my first measure of institutional quality, I constructed an index of government
efficiency following Borge et al. (2008), Borge et al. (2013) and Andrews and Brewer
(2013). The output of each state government is measured by the z-scores for 15 indicators
across five public service sectors: Education, Health, Highways, Public Safety, and
Environment (accounting for 89% of direct general expenditures in 2010) 7. These scores
are weighted by the sector expenditure shares and summed. The index then divides this
output measure by the real revenue per capita received by state and local governments,
reflecting inputs to the public sector 8. This index reflects, to some extent, government
behavior to allocate rent, thus hinting whether the economy is a producer- or grabberfriendly.
The second measure, the number of state public official corruption convictions per
1,000 elected officials (data from the U.S. Department of Justice 9), measures rent-seeking

7

Calculated from “State and Local Government Finances Summary: 2010”, table A-1 “State and Local
Government Finances by Level of Government: 2010”, http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/g10alfin.pdf
8
Details of the index construction and data are provided in Appendix A 1.2.
9
The Public Integrity Section of U.S. Department of Justice surveys the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
nationwide annually on public corruption, defined as crimes involving abuses of the public trust by
government officials. The statistics are published in the annual Report to Congress on the Activities and
Operations of the Public Integrity Section.
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behavior directly. Third, the score of state liability systems comes from the 2002 State
Liability System Ranking Study, a survey of 1,482 in-house general counsel, senior
litigators or attorneys, and other senior executives. It explores how reasonable, fair, and
balanced the state tort liability systems are perceived to be by U.S. business. Finally, the
Economic Freedom of North America Index (EFNA) indicates the degree of government
intervention in the economy beyond its protective function. The government collects
resource rent and expand. Although some would argue that a larger public sector is a drag
on economic growth, that threat is reduced when institutional quality is high, and
government revenues are used for the economically efficient provision of public goods.
The Government Efficiency Index captures these government behaviors on productivity,
while the Economic Freedom Index considers government expansion only. Thus, the
Government Efficiency Index is my preferred institutional quality measure.
With the institution effect, whether resource wealth is a blessing or a curse depends
on institutional quality when the resource rent is realized. To address endogeneity
concerns, I use a time-invariant measure for each of the four variables discussed above.
Specifically, I use the average value of the variable over several years (based on data
availability, see Table 1) prior to the start of my other data series. In my panel data
setting, the state fixed effects preclude an estimation of the marginal effects of the
institutional quality variables themselves. However, by including the interaction term
(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ) in equation (1), I can still test for the institution effect as a

moderator of the resource curse.

In addition to the pre-determined institutional quality measures, I further address the
endogeneity issue in several ways. First, any time-invariant omitted variables, such as
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state geographical characteristics, are captured in the state fixed effect term, si, for which
the fixed effect estimator correct. Then, I employ the statistics introduced by Altonji et
al. (2005 and 2008) 10 to test for bias caused by unobserved time-varying factors. Since
the test statistics can be conducted only in a single-equation setting, I report it in the
sensitivity analysis with the fixed effect and first difference models.
2.3.2.3.

Other covariates

The vectors in 𝐗𝐗 (investment, human capital, and R&D) play two roles in the analysis.
First, they are used as controls in the growth regression (equation 1). Second, in the
resource curse context, each factor is a channel possibly linking resource wealth to
growth. In other words, they are factors potentially crowded-out by resource wealth.
Although the issue of resources affecting institutions is discussed at length in the
literature, I omit institutional quality as a crowded-out factor in this analysis. First, the
crowding-out of institutions may be most relevant in the long run, which annual
variations in the data would hardly reflect. Second, I have chosen to mitigate endogeneity
issues by using time-invariant measures of prior institutional quality, which is exogenous
to contemporary resource production. Thus, I can address the importance of institutions
in mitigating the resource curse but not the crowding-out of institutional quality.
The first potentially crowded-out factor is the investment. Anticipating a stream of
returns from the natural resource, an agent has less desire to invest in man-made capital
for future periods (Corden, 1984; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006). A wage premium in the

10

Please refer to Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2002, 2005 and 2008) for more details on the methodology. I
sincerely appreciate Dr. Elder (Northwestern University) for generously discussing the Altonji-Elder-Taber
statistics and sharing the STATA code.
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resource sector, for example, can signify the reallocation of production factors from the
manufacturing sector to the booming resource sector (Sachs and Warner 2001). While an
expanding resource sector could crowd out the manufacturing sector, the investment on
the margin is more likely to be reallocated into the resource sector. The manufacturing
sector is often characterized by increasing returns to scale and positive externalities
(forward and backward linkages). A decline in the scale of the manufacturing further
decreases the productivity of investments, which accelerates the decrease in investments
(Sachs and Warner, 1995 and 1999a; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh,
2007). Moreover, the volatility of the resource revenue creates uncertainty for investors
in resource economies (Sachs and Warner, 1999b). At the U.S. state level, data on the
gross investment (public and private) by the state is not available. I follow Papyrakis and
Gerlagh (2007) and use the share of industrial machinery production in GSP as a measure
of investment.
The second factor is human capital, long recognized as an important factor to
economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw et al., 1992) and a channel causing the resource
curse (Gylfason, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Shao and
Qi, 2009). Resource abundance may discourage both private and public incentives to
accumulate human capital due to short-sighted behaviors. With higher wage and nonwage incomes related to the resource abundance in the short term, individuals or public
sectors of high discount rates become less motivated in investing in human capital
(Gylfason and Zoega, 2006). At the same time, the typically low skill requirements and
high pay for labor in the resource sector further reduce returns to education with a
resource boom (Gylfason, 2001). These imply a crowding-out of human capital.

21

Different measures of human capital have been used in the literature. Some focus on
education inputs, such as public expenditure on education (Gylfason, 2001), the share of
educational services in gross state product (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007), and gross
secondary-school enrollment (Gylfason, 2001). Education input measures ignore the
effect of labor mobility on the regional human capital stock, and thus on regional growth.
While cross-country research is less concerned with labor movement, the effect could be
significant within a country, especially the U.S. (Weber, 2013). Other indicators measure
regional human capital endowment and use educational attainment in the population,
such as the share of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree (James and Aadland,
2011; Weber, 2013). I use the latter measurement to account for a more direct effect of
the human capital stock on regional growth 11.
Third, research and development (R&D) activities promote economic growth with
technology and productivity improvements. As with investment, a flow of wealth from
natural resources may harm the incentive to innovate for long run benefit; i.e., natural
resource abundance may crowd out innovation 12 (Sachs and Warner, 2001). I use each
state’s R&D intensity, which is the ratio of total R&D performed both from private and
public sectors in a state to its GSP, to indicate the state innovation level. In the case
when R&D occurs in one state but is applied in other states, this measure omits the

11
I also replaced the human capital stock measure with an education measure, state high school graduation
rate, and re-estimated the model. The results are consistent and can be provided upon request.
12
The resource sector directly contributes to R&D expenditures, e.g. the development of horizontal drilling
technology in unconventional oil and gas extraction. However, R&D expenditures in oil and gas
exploration and development counts only 0.0.54% to 1.49% of the overall R&D expenditures in the U.S.
during my sample periods (authors calculated based on data from U.S. Energy Information Administration
and National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics). This should
mitigate any concern on the autocorrelation between R&D expenditures and oil and gas development.
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growth effect of applying R&D outside own state thus fails to capture the complete
growth effect. The degree of omitted variable bias will be tested with Altonji-Elder-Taber
statistics aforementioned.
2.3.3. Data description
The panel dataset covers the 50 U.S. states from 1997 to 2014. Data for R&D activities
come from National Patterns of R&D Resources, and other data are from the U.S. Census
Bureau. The time range of this study starts from 1997 partly because the U.S. Census
Bureau has replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) with the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) since 1997. Most variables contain 900
observations (Table 1-1).
Across the sample, the average annual growth in real per capita personal income is
1.29%, while the average fraction of earnings from both diffuse and point resource
sectors is 4.52%. The variation in point resource specialization is substantial. On the low
end, Delaware has experienced approximately zero point resource extraction in 2011,
2012 and 2014, while Alaska derived 40.71% of earnings from point resource extraction
in 1997. Average mining earnings exceed 10% of the GSP in five states: Wyoming
(29.97%), Alaska (25.84%), West Virginia (12.53%), Louisiana (11.15%), and Oklahoma
(10.00%), compared to the sample mean of 3.06%.
The Government Efficiency Index shows considerable variation. On average from
1990 to 1995, the most efficient state and local government is New Hampshire, with an
index of 1.84, meaning the state and local governments there are 1.84 standard deviations
higher than the mean. Other states with an index higher than 1 are Wisconsin (1.52),
North Dakota (1.43), Vermont (1.42), Minnesota (1.22), Montana (1.16) and Iowa (1.15),
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and the states with an index lower than -1 are Mississippi (-2.25), Louisiana (-1.58),
South Carolina (-1.39), Texas (-1.18) and Alabama (-1.12).
2.4. Discussion of the Econometric Results
I did not find evidence of an overall negative impact on growth by resource wealth across
U.S. states. Decomposing the overall effect, both crowding-out and institution effects are
present: the resource boom crowds out industrial investment, but good institutions
mediate the potential curse. A significant positive direct effect leads the overall resource
effect to be positive. However, the resource effects vary among states, and an overall
negative impact appears in states with low-quality institutions. Moreover, different types
of resources affect growth differently, and oil/gas extraction drives the main results in my
analysis.
2.4.1. Baseline analysis
Table 1-2 reports estimates of the system of equations (1) and (2) with the point resource
measure. In column I, the system is estimated by Fixed Effect (FE) estimator applied
equation-by-equation, while columns II shows the results of the 3SLS estimator with
state and year dummies. In the growth equation, the coefficient on the resource variable is
insignificant for FE estimator and significantly positive for a 3SLS estimator, implying a
positive direct resource effect on growth. Meanwhile, the coefficient on the interaction
between resources and government efficiency is consistently positive and significant,
suggesting an institution effect. In the equations for investment, human capital, and R&D,
the resource coefficient is negative and significant in the investment equation and
positive and significant in the human capital equation. The former supports the crowdingout effect about industrial investment, while the latter suggests an opposite pattern of
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human capital development. The results also suggest conditional income convergence, as
the coefficient on the natural log of lagged per capita income (ln(Inc)t-1) is consistently
negative and significant in the growth equation.
The assumption that all regressors are exogenous is unlikely to hold in a system,
leading to bias. Also, the insignificance of the investment, human capital and R&D
coefficients in growth equation casts further doubt on the FE results. In the 3SLS
estimation, investment, human capital, and R&D are endogenous in the system and
instrumented by included exogenous variables (i.e., state and year dummies, prior income
level, and institutional quality) and excluded instruments of their two-year lags. The
diagnostics showed at the bottom of column II support the identification strategy. The
Anderson LM statistics clearly indicates that the model is not underidentified, and the
Angrist-Pischke F statistics are well above the rule-of-thumb critical value 10, which
suggests that the instruments are not weak. With 3SLS, the coefficients on investment,
human capital, and R&D show the expected sign and are significant at the 5% confidence
level at least.
While endogeneity owing to simultaneous relations among variables can be addressed
by a system of equations model, omitted variables present another possible source of
bias. In my panel setting, dummy variables control for state and year fixed effects, such
as geographical characteristics and time-specific macroeconomic shocks. Regarding
time-variant unobserved variables, I apply the Altonji-Elder-Taber statistic to test for
bias, as a robustness check (see section 2.5.2). The statistic is greater than one so that it is
unlikely that unobservables will explain away the result of interest (Altonji et al., 2005;
Fenske, 2014).
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Table 1-3 further assesses the direct, crowding-out, and institution effects, and also
shows the overall resource effect. According to equation (4), it illustrates the linear
combination of coefficients estimated by 3SLS in Table 2. First, the direct resource effect
is positive and significant. When the crowding out effects and the institution effects are
isolated out, theories do not suggest specific direct resource effects (𝛽𝛽2). In a Solow

growth model, the resources enter the production function as one of the production

factors among physical capital, human capital and technology, implying a positive or
neutral direct effect from resources on growth.
Second, evidence shows a crowding-out effect on investment but not on human capital
or R&D. Measured as the earning share of industrial machinery productions, industrial
investments are crowded out by the expanding resource sector in the 2000s. The effect of
resources on human capital is mixed. A resource boom will draw new employment to the
mining industry at first, which could lower the human capital stock since the mining
sector attracts low- or semi-skilled labor more. However, as local demand increases with
rising incomes rise, living expenses such as house prices or rent rise, as well. This could
encourage lower income, less educated labor to move out of the resource-rich region,
thereby increasing some measures of human capital. Also, resource rents could add to the
state budget thus increasing education expenditure and educational attainment in a state.
These offsetting forces might explain why the effect on human capital is neutral in a high
labor mobility environment such as the U.S. Regarding R&D, the role of technological
developments in extracting unconventional oil and gas may explain the insignificant
crowding-out effect.
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In addition to supporting crowding-out of investment, the evidence also suggests that
institution effects can mitigate the resource curse. The Government Efficiency Index
serves as a measure of ex-ante institutional quality. At the mean level of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,

the coefficient estimate shows a positive effect, significant at the 1% confidence level.
The evidence supports the institution explanation: the resource-growth relation is

conditional on the institutional quality and resource wealth will not be harmful to growth
when the institutional quality is strong. Finally, adding up all three effects, the overall
resource effect is significant and positive. Sampling counties in the south-central U.S.
during a similar time period, Weber (2013) also found little evidence of an emerging
curse from greater natural gas production.
In summary, I did not find evidence of an overall negative effect on growth by
resource wealth in my sample. Further decomposing the resource effect, both crowdingout and institution effects contribute: the resource boom could crowd out industrial
investment, yet good institutions mediate that effect so that the overall impact of
resources on growth is neutral. However, resource effects vary among states due to
variation in the quality of institutions. Moreover, different types of resources can affect
growth in different ways. I explore these issues at further length in the next section.
2.4.2. More on the Institution Effects
Table 1-4 shows the institution effects and overall resource effects in the six most
resource-rich states. The point resource share is above 10% in all six states, as high as
29.97% in Wyoming. Five of these states show a negative Government Efficiency Index,
indicating low government efficiency relative to the national mean. With “bad” ex-ante
institutions, the institution effect worsens the negative impact of resources. Thus a
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resource curse emerges in these states. As shown in the last column of Table 1-4, the
overall resource effect is negative and significant in Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas,
whereas it is positive or neutral in Wyoming, Alaska, and West Virginia.
This further confirms the logic of the institution mediation mechanism: the resource
curse is conditional on the institutional quality, and resource wealth becomes a curse in a
grabber-friendly economy where rent distribution and management are inefficient and
unproductive. In the literature, the United States is an example of resource-rich countries
with strong institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003). The results suggest that government
actions function well enough on average to avoid a curse. However, government
efficiency varies across states, and institutions in states at the low end may be bad enough
that resource wealth in such states becomes harmful to growth.
I further examine the institution effects with different measures of institutional quality.
Table 1-5 shows the coefficient estimates for the growth equation using 3SLS with each
of the institutional quality measures. The coefficients on the resource-institution
interaction term are consistently significant with the expected sign, except with the
Economic Freedom Index, where the estimate is insignificant. These results lend support
to the institution effect as a mechanism for mitigating the potentially negative impact of
resource wealth on growth and are consistent with cross-countries evidence by Mehlum
et al. (2006a, 2006b), Dietz et al. (2007) and Boschini et al. (2013).
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2.4.3. Different Type of Resources
Table 1-6 shows the decomposition of the overall resource effect using different
measures of resources in the 3SLS approach 13. The second row, with point resources, is
the same as the baseline results reported in Table 1-3. The diffuse resource shows no
crowding-out effects on growth factors and a less significant institution effect, with an
insignificant overall resource effect. This is consistent with the literature arguing that
point resources are more likely to be a curse due to their concentrated production and
revenue patterns.
The development of point resources has been heterogeneous in the recent decade. The
U.S. has experienced the large-scale development of unconventional natural gas, which
has been described as a bonanza (Burnett and Weber, 2014). On the other hand, coal
production has contracted. Also, the recent oil and gas revolution is motivated by
technology breakthroughs such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. This
deviates from the traditional characterization of the resource industry as low in
innovation and relying intensively on low-skilled workers. These heterogeneities
motivate me to analyze oil and gas versus other point resources separately 14.
Therefore, I further break down point resources into oil and gas, coal and metal, and
support activities for mining. The last three rows in Table 6 show the comparison of
results. The crowding-out effect on investment and institution effects are stronger with oil
and gas extraction and supporting activities, implying that the oil and gas extraction
drives the resource-growth relation in my sample. A positive resource effect is shown in

13
14

Full sets of results are provided upon request.
I name extraction earning share other than oil and gas “coal and metal” to facilitate the interpretation.
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human capital with oil and gas extraction. Compared with other forms of mining, oil and
gas extraction, especially the unconventional one, requires a higher proportion of highskilled workers (e.g. petroleum engineers). This may explain the different resource
effects on human capital. No evidence of crowding-out effects is present with coal and
metal. The institution effect turns negative and significant with coal and metal, which is
inconsistent with the narrative of the institution effect. The overall resource effects are
neutral across different types of resources.
2.5. Sensitivity Checks
I conduct three sensitivity checks, including the Added Controls Approach, dynamic and
spatial models, and re-estimation with alternative dependent variables. The results are
consistent with the baseline results reported above.
First, since time-varying unobserved variables are a common source of bias in a fixed
effect setting, I employ the Added Controls Approach (ACA), originally proposed by
Altonji et al. (2005) and formally named by Lopez et al. (2011). This method enhances
the controls by using a large set of additional time-varying control sets in sequence.
I am particularly concerned with the unobserved time-varying changes in institutional
quality that may correlate with resource extraction. Studies have found that governance,
demographic and social characteristics, and lobbying and other rent-seeking behaviors
correlate with institutional changes. As I add the Governance, Demographics, and the
Rent-Seeking Behavior sets of controls

15

in sequence into the fixed effect model on

equation (3), the within R-square increases relative to the base model, suggesting a rise in

15

Detailed definition and data source on all the supplement variables are available in Appendix A 1.3.

30

the explanatory power. Moreover, the coefficients on the point resource and the
interaction are consistent with my main results 16.
Second, to further check the sensitivity of results to dynamic and spatial effects, I
estimate reduced form equation (3) using a static fixed effect estimator with Driscoll and
Kraay’s standard error (FE) 17, a first difference estimator (FD), a dynamic panel
estimator (Sys-GMM), a spatial autocorrelation model (SAC), and a dynamic spatial
panel estimator (Dynamic-SAC) . Again, the two coefficients of primary interest —on the
point resource and the interaction— are consistent with the main results: the institution
effect is significant and positive while the direct resource effect is neutral or positive 18. I
conclude that my baseline results are fairly robust to the dynamic and spatial effects of
state growth.
Third, I replace the dependent variable, annual growth in per capita personal income,
with growth in real Gross State Production (GSP) per capita, and growth rate in state
population and re-estimate the system with 3SLS 19. The main results are robust to using
the population growth as the dependent variable, rather than personal income.
2.6. Conclusion
The resource curse hypothesis—resource rich economies underperform in economic
growth— has been tested across countries, especially in developing countries. In this
study, I tested that hypothesis within the highly developed the United States. A system of

16

Results are available in Appendix A 1.4.
One approach to address spatial correlation is Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) nonparametric technique;
another approach is to directly model the interdependence via spatial panel models. I apply both methods to
check the sensitivity of the results.
18
Results are available in Appendix A 1.5.
19
Results are available in Appendix A 1.6.
17
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equations model allows me to decompose the resource effect and account for the two
mechanisms, crowding-out effects and institution effects, simultaneously in one setting.
The results suggest that both effects contribute to the resource-growth relation, but also
that the overall resource effect is positive or neutral. The results confirm that institutions
mediate the crowding-out effect and reject the resource curse hypothesis within the U.S.
in the past two decades.
This decomposition with the direct, crowding-out, and institution effects at a
subnational level offers a better understanding of resource curse mechanisms. First, I
found that the direct resource effect was positive or neutral once the crowding-out and
institutional effects were isolated. Second, the evidence suggests that resource wealth
crowds out industrial investment, thus hindering growth in the U.S. This result parallels
the local Dutch Disease narrative that wealth generated by the sale of natural resources
tends to crowd out the manufacturing sector. However, I did not find evidence supporting
the crowding-out of other factors documented in the literature, such as human capital
stock and R&D expenditure.
Third, the resource curse is conditional on institutional quality in the U.S., supporting
the institution mediation effect. I focus on state and local government efficiency as a
proxy for institutional outcomes and further employ ex-ante measures to minimize
endogeneity concerns. In their careful cross-country study on the resource curse,
Boschini et al. (2013) found that an outcome measure, “institutional quality” from the
International Country Risk Guide, was the one exhibiting strong empirical regularity,
comparing to other rule-oriented measures. Consistently in my study, the institution
mediation effect shows explanatory power even within the U.S., where “rules” such as

32

constitutional arrangements, the degree of democracy, or property rights are strong but
state government efficiencies vary. The result suggests the importance of resource rent
management in the short-run. A natural extension to this study would be to trace the
analysis further back as “rules” varied along with time across the U.S., so that both
aspects of institutions, as well as the long-run crowding-out effects, can be tested.
Finally, adding up all three effects, the overall effect of resource wealth on growth is
positive or neutral as a general pattern in the U.S. However, the resource effects vary
among states, and the resource “curse” seems to appear in states with low institutional
qualities, including resource-rich Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Moreover, different
types of resources affect growth differently, and oil and gas extraction drives the main
results in my study. This should draw special policy attention in the context of the shale
gas boom since the late 1990s.
In a recent overview of the resource curse literature, Frederick van der Ploeg (2011)
stated that a key question remained “why some resource-rich economies [.] are more
successful while others perform badly despite their immense natural wealth”(page 366).
My study contributes another piece of evidence regarding the U.S.: even though
relatively strong institutions work to avoid a widespread resource curse, some crowding
out occurs and may be an issue in states with weaker institutions.
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2.7. Tables in Chapter 2
Table 2-1 Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Definition

Growth
Income

Annual growth in real per capita personal income (%)
Annual real per capita personal income (chained 2009 $)

Resource_diffuse

Annual percent of earnings in agriculture, forestry, and fishing (%)

Resource_point

Annual percent of earnings in mining (%)
a
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Annual percent of earnings in oil and gas extraction (%)
Resource_oil&gas
a
Resource_coal&metal Annual percent of earnings in extractions other than oil and gas (%)
Annual percent of earnings in support activities for mining (%)
Resource_supporta
Investment

a

Annual ratio of industrial machinery production to its GSP (%)

Human Capital
R&D1

Annual percentage of state population with a college degree (%)
Annual ratio of total R&D performed in a state to its GSP (%)

Gov. Efficiency b

Average Z-score of government services per capita government
revenue (state and local government only), 1990-1995
Average annual public official corruption convictions per 1,000
elected officials3,1987-1997
Average annual Economic Freedom of North America Index (scale
from 0 to 10),1981-1995

Corruption
Econ. Freedom Index
Liability

Average annual score of state liability system (scale from 0 to 100),
20024

Mean

Std.Dev. Min
-11.50

Max

1.29

2.32

13.38

37464.22

5937.57

1.35

1.51

0.00

8.99

3.06
1.47

6.09
3.92

0.00
0.00

40.71
38.05

1.23

2.62

0.00

17.86

0.44

0.95

0.00

6.98

0.97
26.45

0.85
4.95

0.01
14.60

5.55
41.20

2.12

1.52

0.10

8.76

0.08

0.87

-2.25

1.84

2.49

3.83

0.09

24.34

6.73

0.72

5.06

8.02

57.16

8.72

28.40

78.60

25022.48 58703.24

Note: a. The five variables – resource_oil&gas, resource_coal&metal, resource_support, investment, and R&D – cover from 1997 to 2013, with
850 observations. b. Authors calculated. Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for details. c. The number of state public official corruption convictions is
from the U.S. Department of Justice. The number of elected officials by the state is reported in 1987, 1992, and 1997 Census of Government. d.
The earliest data available for Liability is 2002 from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Table 2-2 Testing the Resource Curse in a System of Equations, Point Resources
Investment

Ln(Inc)t-1
Resource_point
Constant

Human
Capital

adj. R2
Ln(Inc)t-1
Resource_point
Constant

R&D

adj. R2
Ln(Inc)t-1
Resource_point
Constant

Growth

adj. R2
Ln(Inc)t-1
Resource_point
Resource_point
×Gov. Efficiency
Investment
Human Capital
R&D
Constant

I.
FE
0.43
(0.31)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-3.66
(3.21)

3SLS
0.31
(0.26)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-2.42
(2.70)

0.92
0.43
(1.08)
0.08**
(0.03)
13.85
(11.12)

0.92
0.46
(1.13)
0.10***
(0.04)
14.80
(11.57)

0.95
-0.79*
(0.42)
0.00
(0.02)
9.87**
(4.27)

0.96
-1.06*
(0.55)
0.01
(0.02)
12.58**
(5.67)

0.88
-8.61***
(2.29)
0.12
(0.14)
0.30**
(0.14)
0.37
(0.28)
0.06
(0.04)
-0.08
(0.10)
89.30***
(23.49)

0.89
-10.78***
(2.04)
0.23***
(0.08)
0.41***
(0.07)
3.36***
(0.75)
0.26*
(0.15)
1.52**
(0.69)
102.7***
(21.06)

0.57
847
Yes
Yes

0.61
747
Yes
Yes
18.40***
25.16***
33.17***
15.14***

adj. R2
No.Observations
State Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Anderson LM stat.
Angrist-Pischke F-stat.

II.

Investment
Human Capital
R&D

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; in column (3) 3SLS estimation:
instrumented: investment, human capital, R&D, included instruments: lagged per capita income level,
lagged point resource, interaction of lagged point resource and pre-determined government efficient index,
state fixed effect, and year fixed effect, excluded instruments: lagged investment, human capital, and R&D.
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Table 2-3 Decomposition of the Marginal Resource Effect on Growth, Point Resources
Direct Effect
0.23***
(0.08)

Investment
-0.11**
(0.04)

Crowding-out Effect
Human Capital
0.03
(0.02)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

R&D
0.01
(0.03)

Institution Effect
0.03***
(0.01)

Overall
Resource Effect
0.19**
(0.07)

Note: according to Equation (4) = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , calculated based on
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
3SLS estimation results of Equation (1) and (2) with point resources; Standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2-4 The Institution Effects and Overall Resource Effects in Six Resource-Rich
States
Resourcerich states

Point
Resource
Share

Ex Ante Gov.
Efficiency
Index

Institution Effects

Overall Resource
Effects

Wyoming

29.97%

0.24

0.10*** (0.02)

0.25*** (0.08)

Alaska

25.84%

-0.02

-0.01***(0.00)

0.15** (0.07)

West
Virginia

12.53%

-0.47

-0.19***(0.03)

-0.03 (0.06)

Louisiana

11.15%

-1.58

-0.64***(0.11)

-0.48***(0.10)

Oklahoma

10.00%

-0.86

-0.35***(0.06)

-0.19***(0.07)

Texas

9.75%

-1.18

-0.48***(0.08)

-0.32***(0.08)

Note: “Institution Effects” are (𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ) and “Overall resource effects” are calculated
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
based on the equation (4) = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , where the coefficient
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
estimations are from 3SLS in column (3) table2 and the Government Efficiency Index values are
listed in the third column.
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Table 2-5 Institution Reversal Effects with Different Institutional Quality Proxies
Growth
Ln(Inc)t-1
Resource_point
Resource_point
×Gov.Efficiency
Resource_point
×Corruption
Resource_point
×EFI
Resource_point
×Liability
Investment
Human Capital
R&D
Constant
No.Observations
State Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect

I.
Gov.
Efficiency
-10.78***
(2.03)
0.23***
(0.08)
0.41***
(0.07)

II.
Corruption
-8.60***
(1.98)
0.37***
(0.10)

III.
Econ. Freedom
Index (EFI)
-8.85***
(1.99)
4.60***
(0.77)

IV.
Liability
-8.91***
(2.01)
-1.81***
(0.41)

-0.13***
(0.03)
-0.64
(0.51)

3.36***
(0.75)
0.26*
(0.15)
1.52**
(0.69)
102.7***
(21.06)
747
Yes
Yes

2.53***
(0.71)
0.27*
(0.15)
1.60**
(0.69)
80.50***
(20.76)
747
Yes
Yes

2.83***
(0.71)
0.19
(0.15)
1.79***
(0.67)
84.39***
(21.05)
747
Yes
Yes

0.04***
(0.01)
2.74***
(0.73)
0.30*
(0.16)
1.58**
(0.70)
83.43***
(20.95)
747
Yes
Yes

Note: the 3SLS estimation results of Equation (1) and results on equations (2) is omitted;
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2-6 Decomposition of the Overall Resource Effect: Different Type of Resources
Direct
Effect

Crowding-out Effect
Human
Investment
R&D
Capital
0.20**
0.00
0.05
(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.06)

0.033*
(0.0195)

Overall
Resource
Effect
-0.18
(0.25)

0.01
(0.03)

0.03***
(0.01)

0.19**
(0.07)

0.05*
(0.03)

0.02
(0.03)

0.03***
(0.01)

0.15
(0.10)

0.01
(0.05)

- 0.01
(0.01)

- 0.02
(0.05)

-0.09**
(0.02)

0.03
(0.15)

-0.19**
(0.09)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.05
(0.07)

0.06***
(0.01)

0.17
(0.16)

Diffuse
Resource

-0.46
(0.38)

Point Resource

0.23***
(0.08)

-0.11**
(0.0395)

0.03
(0.02)

Oil and Gas

0.13
(0.10)

-0.07**
(0.03)

Coal and
Metal

0.13
(0.15)

Support
Activities for
Mining

0.37**
(0.16)

Note: according to Equation (4) )

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

Institution
Effects

= 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , calculated based on

3SLS estimation results of equations (1) and (2) with different resource types; Standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 3 The Impacts of Resource Development in China and the United States: A
Comparative Analysis
3.1. Introduction
The effect of resource wealth on economic growth has received considerable attention in
the economics and political science literature over the last 20 years. Cross-country
empirical studies tested the resource – growth relation, often referred as the resource
curse hypothesis, with no consensus conclusions (Auty 1993; Sachs and Warner 1995;
Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004; Alexeev and Conrad 2009). Country-level observations
offer significant variations in resource endowments, and economic growths, which
facilitate the analysis. However, many confounding features, such as geography, culture,
and institution quality, also exist and could potentially bias the results, especially in
cross-sectional analysis. The concern persists with panel-data given the time-varying
hard-to-measure factors like macroeconomic policies.
To alleviate these issues, within-country evidence have also emerged, sampling in
China (Fan, Fang and Park, 2012; Ji, Magnus and Wang, 2014; Shao and Qi, 2009), the
U.S. (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2007; Weber 2013), Canada (Papyrakis and Raveh 2014),
Russia (Alexeev and Chernyavskiy 2015) and Peru (Aragón, Rud and Arag, 2013) among
other nations. Regional level analyses reduce the danger of spurious correlations by
analyzing subnational regions facing the same economic system, institution arrangement,
macroeconomic policies, and less various cultures and institutional qualities. The tradeoff
is to forgo opportunities of testing impacts from persistent features, such as the economic
system and institution arrangement. For economies in transition, weak price signal and
prevailing state ownership likely lead to inefficient resource allocation, leaving a weak or
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even negative resource-growth relation. The main goal of this paper is to illustrate this
argument using comparative regional-level analysis of the resource wealth impacts in
China and the United States.
Among other nations, several unique characteristics endow China and the U.S. suitable
for the resource-growth relation comparison. First, China and the U.S. were the top two
countries in primary energy production in 2015. The resource endowment varies
significantly across Chinese provinces and American states. Second, with similar size of
gross economies, China and the U.S. contrast with each other in economic systems and
institution arrangements. The comparison could shed light on impacts of market and
fiscal reforms in China since the 1990s. Third, both countries have experienced booming
in resource extractions in the 2000s yet with different resources. Being able to decompose
resources into crude oil, natural gas, and coal helps to further identify the booming effect
from the country effect.
In this study, I use comparable measures to examine the effects of resource revenues
on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and
American states from 1990 to 2015. With the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy
implemented in the panel datasets, I show that regions with higher resource revenues
grow faster than other regions in both China and the U.S. The positive resource effect is
larger in the U.S. Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g.
the market price reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show
that the market price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources
contribute the positive resource effect in China. Though strong and positive resource –
growth relations appear in both countries, evidence also suggests consistent negative
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resource effects on certain growth-related factors in both countries, such as educational
attainments and R&D activities.
The resource – growth relation has been studied in both China and the U.S. at the
regional level. A few empirical studies within China concluded mixed results. Using a
panel dataset from 1985 to 2005 at the provincial level and pooled regression model,
Zhang, Xing, Fan, and Luo (2008) associated a slower growth rate of per capita
consumption with rich resources, especially in the rural region. Shao and Qi (2009)
confirmed resource curse hypothesis in China, and the crowding-out effect is mainly
towards human capital input. Moreover, Shao and Qi (2009) sampled ten provinces from
western China, which may lead to selection bias because they are all from inland China
with lower initial development comparing to the East. On the other hand, Fan, Fang and
Park (2012b) found no supportive evidence to the “resource curse” phenomenon in city
level of China over the period 1997-2005 for the 95 cities with a functional coefficient
model. Ji, Magnus and Wang (2014) applied two different resource abundance measuresthe resource reserve stock measure and the resource revenue flow measure – and found a
positive resource effect on economic growth at the provincial level in China between
1990 and 2008. Overall, the mixed results can be attributed to different samples,
measures and methods that have been applied, and also some drawbacks on
measurements and models.
This study contributes to the literature with the first comparison piece between Chinese
provinces and the U.S. states on testing the resource-growth relation. Closest to this
study, Alexeev and Chernyavskiy (2014) examine the effect of oil on the growth of
Russia’s regions and American states. I improve the analysis by employing an
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Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy to address the omitted variable bias and potential
reverse causality. To the best of my knowledge, this is also the first study in the China
literature to link and empirically test impacts of market price reforms and the fiscal
reform in the resource-growth relation.
3.2. Resource Development in China and the U.S.
3.2.1. Resource Production and Reserves
Both China and the U.S. have developed from rich land with large resource endowments.
According to the Global Energy Statistical Yearbook (2016), China and the U.S. lead the
world in primary energy productions 20 in 2015 at 2,640 and 2,012 million metric tons of
oil equivalents (Mtoe) respectively, followed by Russian at 1,341 Mtoe. China surpassed
the U.S. and became the world largest energy producer in 2005. Figure 2-1 and 2-2
compare the total primary energy production by resource types in China and the U.S.
since 1990.
Despite large total energy productions, the two countries show different energy
compositions 21. Coal dominates the primary energy production in China. China has been
the world’s leading coal producer and consumer since the early 1980s. In 1990, 77.8
percent of the total primary energy production was from coal, while crude oil, natural
gas, and other renewable energy made up 19.9, 2 and 0.3 percent respectively. Until
2014, coal remains the main energy source in China, accounting for 76.5 percent of the

20

Primary energy is an energy form found in nature that has not been subjected to any conversion or
transformation process.
21
To enable the comparison across resources, I convert different energy units for crude oil (barrels), natural
gas (cubic feet) and coal (metric tons) into the heat unit – British thermal unit (Btu) based on heat content
of fuels.
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total primary energy production. Crude oil has dropped to 8.3 percent while natural gas
and other energy have increased to 4.3% and 10.8% of total primary energy production.
In the U.S., the energy composition has been balanced and stable. Natural gas has
surpassed coal and taken the largest share of primary energy production at 33 percent
since 2011. In 2014, natural gas, coal, crude oil, and other renewable energy was 33.5,
25.4, 22.6 and 18.4 percent of the total primary energy production respectively.
Energy productions have been increasing in both China and the U.S. during the study
period, with distinct booming resources. In 2015, coal production more than quadrupled
in China at 3.68 billion metric tons, comparing to the production in 2000 at 0.88 billion
metric tons. The surge in coal production took place between 2000 and 2009 with more
than 10 percent growth rate annually. 25 out of 31 provinces or province equivalent
municipalities produced coal. The top three coal-producing provinces, Shanxi, Inner
Mongolia, and Shaanxi, all located in northern and central China, supplied 64 percent of
the total coal production. During the same period, coal production stagnated at around 0.8
to 1 billion metric tons in the U.S. (Figure 2-2 panel C). Wyoming alone accounted for
41.9 percent of total U.S. coal production in 2015. Four states in the Appalachian region,
West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, together produced another 20
percent. Owing to the shale oil and gas development, production of natural gas and crude
oil has boomed in the U.S. after 2005. In 2013, the U.S. surpassed Russia and became the
world largest gas producer. In 2015, the top five natural gas-producing states are Texas
(27.4%), Pennsylvania (16.7%), Oklahoma (8.7%), Wyoming (6.2%), and Louisiana
(6.2%), which accounted for approximately 65 percent of the total natural gas production
in the U.S. Similarly, about 65 percent of U.S. crude oil production came from five states
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in 2015: Texas (37%), North Dakota (12%), California (6%), Alaska (5%), and
Oklahoma (5%).
Different production pattern reveals different reserve mix in the two countries. Figure
2-3 compares proved reserves of the crude oil, natural gas, and coal in China and the U.S.
in 1990. While both countries held similar crude oil, the U.S. was rich in natural gas and
China was with much larger coal endowment. In China, coal fields concentrate in north
central regions where the top three coal-producing provinces, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia,
and Shaanxi, are adjacent. China’s largest oil fields are located in the northeast region
(Daqing field), the northwest’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (including the
Junggar and Tarim basins), and north central region in Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and
Gansu provinces (Ordos Basin) (Gordon, Sautin and Tao 2014 22). The primary natural
gas-producing regions in China are Sichuan province in the southwest (Sichuan Basin),
the Xinjiang and Qinghai provinces in the northwest (Tarim, Junggar and Qaidam
Basins), and Gansu province in the north center (Ordos Basin).
In summary, China and the U.S. are the top two energy producing countries in the
world. Yet, the resource composition and extractions contrast between the two, where
coal has been the dominant energy resource in China and natural gas has recently become
the main energy in the U.S. In either China or the U.S., resource endowments tend to
concentrate in certain regions but also show regional sparsity across oil, natural gas, and
coal. These variations offer opportunities to identify resource type effects from the

22

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Deborah Gordon, Yevgen Sautin, and Wang Tao),
"China's Oil Future", May 6, 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/06/china-s-oil-future-pub-55437
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country effect, which is driven by two distinct institution settings between China and the
U.S.
3.2.2. Resource-related Policies in China
The distinctive economic systems in China and the U.S. could make a difference in
resource-growth relations. As the world’s largest national economy in nominal terms, the
U.S. is a mixed economy and more towards a free market economy. Run by a single
party, the Communist Party of China (CPC), China is an economy in transition from
planning to market-orienting. Since the economic reform in December 1978, China has
been the world’s fastest-growing major developing economy. Given the strategic role in
the economy and national security, resource sectors, especially energy sectors, fall behind
in the market reform and are still heavily managed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). I
discuss three resource-related policy shifts in China since 1990 (Table 2-1).
3.2.2.1.

Market Price Reforms

Before 1978, China adopted a state pricing system in which the state set prices of goods,
including energy prices, regardless market forces. In 1984, a dual pricing system was
implemented. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) could sell up to a predetermined quota of
goods at state-set prices and then sell above the quota at higher prices. Facing energy
shortages and weak incentive in energy conservation investment, China began to reform
its energy prices in 1993 and pushed it forward with different paces and scales across
energy types (Zhang 2014).
Coal was ahead of oil and natural gas in the price reform. In 1993, coal prices were
formed in a two-track system: the price of non-utility-use coal was determined by the
market, whereas the price of utility-use coal, the so-called power coal, was based on
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“guidance price” set by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 23.
NDRC abolished its guidance price for power coal in 2003 and set price bands for
negotiations between coal producers and electricity generators, which was further
abolished in December 2012. As shown in Figure 2-4 panel C, the state-set coal price was
under market prices, e.g. the world coal price or the U.S. coal price before 1993. Since
1993, the average coal price in China has tracked the world coal price well with less
fluctuation, due to the guidance price then later price bands for the power coal till 2012.
Between 1994 and 1997, the crude oil price was set at irregular intervals by the State
Planning Commission (SPC). Since 1998, domestic crude oil prices have tracked
international prices but not the case for refined oil product price. Until May 2009, refined
oil prices would be adjusted if the moving average of international crude oil prices
changes more than 4 percent within 22 consecutive working days, which was shortened
to 10 working days in March 2013. Comparing to the world and U.S. oil prices, the crude
oil price in China moved from lower prices before 1993 to higher prices and had tracked
the world price fluctuations closely since 1998 (Figure 2-4 panel A).
Natural gas prices are still set by the state throughout the supply chain today. Since
1978, the state has adjusted the wellhead price of natural gas five times in 1982, 1994,
2002, 2007, and 2010 (Shi et al. 2012). The most recent price adjustment in June 2010
has increased domestic producer price of natural gas by 25 percent (Figure 2-4 panel B).

23

In 2012, about half of the coal in China was used for power generation. The industrial sector, including
steel, iron, cement, and coke, accounted for 41 percent usage, and the remaining share was consumed by
the residential, service, and other sectors (National Bureau of Statistics, China, 2014).
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With the shale development in the U.S., both world and U.S. natural gas prices have
dropped since 2005.
Prices reveal values of natural resources and translate resource endowments into
resource revenue or wealth in an economy. Market prices effectively signal the resource
scarcity and market forces, thus lead to an efficient resource allocation. Therefore, I
hypothesize that the market price reform on resource sectors in China will stimulate
resource revenue to contribute the regional growth more or meditate a potential resource
curse relation.
3.2.2.2.

Resource Ownerships and the Fiscal Reform

That how the resource rent flow matters in the resource-growth relation. Point resources
(e.g., minerals and fossil fuels) generate concentrated production and revenue patterns,
which are more likely to be controlled by relatively small groups of society, exhibiting
so-called “executive discretion in revenue allocation” (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). In
the U.S., both private and public sectors can capture the resource rent or wealth,
depending on ownerships of land or resources (Weber, Burnett and Xiarchos, 2016;
Weber, Wang and Chomas, 2016). Total resource rents are channeled to land owners,
resource extraction companies, and governments through royalties, profit, and taxes
respectively. Resource endowment could fuel regional economic growth if localities
retain a certain share of resource rent and direct them to promote local development. For
example, Weber, Burnett and Xiarchos (2016) show that the oil and gas tax base in Texas
is capitalized into housing values and increases in school revenues through local property
taxes on oil and gas wells.
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The resource rent flow looks differently in China because the state owns all lands and
natural resources. Three major national oil companies – China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) – dominate the oil and natural gas
upstream and downstream sectors. CNPC is the upstream leader and accounts for an
estimated 54 percent and 77 percent of China’s crude oil and natural gas output,
respectively, according to FACTS Global Energy (FGE) 24. With relatively lower capital
input, coal mining in China has traditionally been fragmented among large state-owned
coal mines, local state-owned coal mines, and thousands of small-scale town and village
coal mines. In turn, they account for about 50, 20, and 30 percent of the total coal output
(Andrews-Speed et al. 2000). Nonetheless, the state would capture all the resource rent
since it owns both natural resources and companies. Assume that revenues of provincial
or local government influence regional economic growth more directly than central
government revenues, the question becomes how central and provincial governments
split resource revenues.
In the distribution of resource rents, the province and local governments have gained
more rights from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In 1994, China adopted a taxsharing system between central and provincial government: taxes that are broad and
concentrated, such as the consumption tax and tariffs, are assigned to the central
government; those are narrow and scatter are provincial and local taxes; and other taxes
are split between the central and provincial governments. Onshore resource taxes are

24

FGE, China Oil & Gas Monthly: Data Tables, March 2015 (EIA estimates), pages 1 and 8.
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assigned to provincial and local governments while the central government is collecting
revenues from resource taxes offshore. In 2011, China installed an ad valorem resource
tax of 5% on oil and natural gas, instead of taxes levied on extracted volume since 1985.
Besides resource taxes, more than 30 taxes and fees are levied on the mining industry.
Value-added tax, income tax, and resource tax account for about 80 percent of the tax
revenue from mining industry (see Table 2-2). Overall, the central government captured
51.55 percent tax revenues from resources, leaving the rest with provincial governments
and their localities. However, the tax-sharing system increased the share of the central
government in the total government revenue to 55.7 percent in 1994 from 22 percent in
the previous year (Zhang 2014). Nonetheless, under the new regulations since 1994,
province governments were permitted to explore and develop mineral resources and
allowed to auction the development rights of mineral resources to the private sector,
including multinational companies, though SOEs still enjoyed preferential treatment in
developing large mineral reserves. Province and local governments have a strong
incentive to sell exploration and mining rights since it is a quick way to create revenues.
As a result, many small-scale mines have been privatized since 1994.
In summary, I recognize the year 1994 and 2011 as key policy changing years with the
fiscal reform and the adjustment of the resource tax rate in China. On the one hand, the
tax-sharing system increased revenues for the central government and reduced provincial
government tax revenues. It could weaken the link between resource endowments and the
regional growth. On the other hand, the privatization process on small-scale mines since
1994 could help to retain the resource wealth at the local level. Therefore, the effect of
the 1994 policy on the resource-growth relation leaves as an empirical question.
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3.2.2.3.

Regional Development Strategies

To narrow the development gap among regions, the Chinese government has
implemented three large-scale development strategies since the 2000s (Figure 2-5). One
of them, namely the Western Development Strategy, is energy focused. Moreover, the
other two, the Revitalize Northeast China Strategy, and the Rise of Central China
Strategy, show certain resource related elements.
The Western China Development Strategy was carried out in January 2000, covering
six provinces, five autonomous regions, and one municipality. In 2000, this region
produced 69.8 percent natural gas, 19.1 percent crude oil, and 27.19 percent coal of the
national output respectively. Part of this significant policy package is to promote natural
resource exploitation in this region with the help of infrastructure projects such as WestEast Gas Pipeline, West-East Electric Transmission Line, and Qinghai-Tibet Railway.
With most of the infrastructure projects completed by 2010, energy productions increased
significantly comparing to those at the beginning of the Western China Development. In
2015, the western region contributed 80.1 percent natural gas, 32.4 percent crude oil, and
54.7 percent coal to the total primary energy output.
Northeast China consists of 3 provinces and the eastern part of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Regions. The Daqing oil field, located in this region, is one of the oldest and
most prolific fields in China, constituting 19 percent of the total crude oil production.
Owing to the abundant resource endowment and geopolitical relations with the pre-Soviet
Union, northeast China was built as the first and largest industrialized region in the 1950s
to 1960s (Zhang 2008). It felt behind in development since 1978 when the reform and
opening up policy focused on coastal areas and northeast region supplied raw and
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processed materials with low state-set prices to the southeast coastal area. The Revitalize
Northeast China Strategy since 2004 targeted structure adjustment and transform the
large and medium-sized State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) into the modern corporate
system, including oil, chemical, and automobile industries. The three provinces closed
122 bankrupt SOEs in 2004 and 2005 (Zhang 2008). The share of primary energy
production from this region has been declining – the region produced 52.69 percent crude
oil, 28.66 percent natural gas, and 14.83 percent coal in 1990; however, in 2015, these
shares dropped to 25.80 percent crude oil, 4.55 percent natural gas, and 3.69 percent coal.
The six provinces in the Rise of Central China strategy targeted agricultural
industrialization except for Shanxi province. Due to the declining economic
performance, Shanxi was nominated as the first national reform pilot area focusing on the
resource sector transformation in 2010. In 2015, Shanxi is still the largest coal producing
province, accounted for 25.6 percent of total coal output in China.
In central China, the traditional coal province, Shanxi, is under reform pilot to deal
with the poor economic performance. In western China, the resource-rich region is
encouraged to extract more to stimulate regional growth. Studies that investigated the
role of the Western Development Strategy in the resource–growth relation have drawn
various conclusions: Shao and Qi (2009) suggested the 2000 policy change induced a
resource curse in the western region while Ji, Magnus and Wang (2014) found a positive
correlation between economic growth and resource revenues after the 2000 policy shock,
though the effect declines in the long run. I test policy impacts in China, aiming to
explain differences or similarities of resource-growth relations between Chinese
provinces and the U.S. states.
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3.3. Empirical Analysis
Two main goals are in the empirical analysis: 1) to investigate and compare resource
effects in China and the U.S. on regional economic growth and other growth-related
factors, including investment, education attainment in the population, R&D activities, and
corruptions; 2) to test policy interventions in altering the resource – growth relation in
China.
3.3.1. Model Specification and Identification
A panel model is specified in equation (1) to test resource effects at province or state
level in China and the U.S. respectively:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

Subscripts i and t index province (state) and time, respectively. Y represents outcome

variables. In the resource – growth relation, Y is the growth in real per capita GDP. In
testing resource effects on growth-related factors, Y is investment share, college
population share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per
million persons respectively (Table 2-2). GDPpc is provincial or state GDP per capita
with one period lag that controls for the initial GDP level. R is resource revenue per
capita. I measure four resource revenues by resource types: crude oil, natural gas, and
coal revenue per capita and total resource revenue per capita. The first three revenues are
obtained by multiplying annual production with provincial or regional prices for each
resource. Then sum all revenues from the three resources to obtain total resource revenue.
All resource revenues are deflated into 2009 real currency and divided by the population
to get the revenue per capita by province (or state) by year. Province or state level prices
are used whenever possible to obtain province or state specific revenue on a certain
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resource. Regional prices are employed when the province or state-specific price data are
not available. 𝛽𝛽2 indicates the resource effect in testing. X is a matrix of growth-related

variables including investment share, college population share, R&D expenditure share,
patents per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons. They are omitted if the
growth- related variable become the outcome variable to be tested. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a province/state-

specific fixed effect for each province/state i, which accounts for confounding factors that
are common to the same province or state over time. 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 is the dummy variable for year,

which allows for nationwide shocks and growth trends over time not otherwise accounted
for by the explanatory variables. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents all remaining unobserved determinants of
outcomes.

Two issues warrant discussion on the model specification: reverse causality and
omitted variables. The regional economic growth or development level could alter
resource production decisions thus draw concerns of reverse causality. In China, regional
development strategies aim to promote economic development through favorable policy
packages including industrial policies. In the case of the West Development Strategy,
economic developments in the 12 western provinces or province equivalent regions were
lagged behind, and energy sectors were picked to promote aiming to stimulate the
regional growth, which could bias the result downward.
Omitted variable will bias coefficients if a third factor affects both resource revenues
in the region and the outcome variable, e.g. regional growth or other regional growthrelated factors. The province or state fixed effects sweep out time-invariant features of a
province or state. The year dummies control for national shocks or other omitted factors
that change over time across the country. Unobserved time-variant regional
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characteristics could bias the result. A province or state can influence whether or not
extraction occurs in their area. With a fiscal decentralization process in the late 1980s
and early 1990s in China, province and local governments have strong incentives to sell
mining rights to generate revenues. In the U.S., the states of New York and Vermont
have placed moratoria on unconventional energy extraction, due to the potential local
externalities related to the practice, such as air, water, and noise pollution, amongst other
things. Whether a regional economy is “producer friendly” or “grabber friendly” in
allocating entrepreneurial activities is changing over time and a challenge to observe.
To address the potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias, I require an
instrument for resource revenue measures, R, in equation (1). I rely on the geographic
variations in resource reserves in the initial year 1990 and multiply them with the national
primary resource prices. Oil, gas, coal and total resource revenue measures are
instrumented with corresponding reserves and prices. The Two-Stage Least Square
(2SLS) estimator is specified in equation (2) and (3).
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1990 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛿𝛿 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3)

Two conditions are required for the instrumental variable strategy to be valid. First,

resource reserves and national resource price must have a significant effect on regional
resource revenues. This condition holds intuitively and can be tested statistically with the
first-stage F test. Second, the instrument should be exogenous to the error term in
equation (1). The spatial variation in initial resource reserves or endowments comes from
the geological characteristic and the exploration technology at the time. The former is
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exogenous natural factors, and the latter might reflect general initial economic factors but
exogenous to the provincial or state economic conditions. With state and year fixed
effects control for the general shocks and trends, national resource prices are plausibly
exogenous to regional time-variant unobservables. Similar strategies have been
successfully implemented by Papyrakis and Raveh (2014), Allcott and Keniston (2014)
and Cascio and Narayan (2015).
3.3.2. Data and Summary Statistics
I construct two panel datasets of Chinese provinces and U.S. states from 1990 to 2015.
For consistent comparison, variables are defined as closely as possible given data
availabilities (see Table 3). The China dataset covers 30 provincial level regions of
mainland China. Mainland China consists of 22 provinces, five minority autonomous
regions, four municipalities and two special autonomous regions. One minority
autonomous region (Tibet) and two special autonomous regions (Hong Kong and Macao)
were omitted due to the missing data issue. In 1996, Chongqing was separated from
Sichuan Province as the fourth municipality after Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. I
combined Chongqing and Sichuan data after 1996 to keep consistency. The data were
from China National Bureau of Statistics and China Economic Information Network. The
U.S. dataset covers the 50 U.S. states. Resource related data are from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA). Other data sources include the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Science Foundations, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S.
Department of Justice and Yamarik (2013). There are 750 observations in China dataset
and 1,300 observations in the U.S. dataset.
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Table 2-4 shows the summary statistics and comparison of Chinese provinces and U.S.
states. Owing to a much larger population, the total resource revenue per capita in
Chinese provinces is ¥1,417 (about $207.5), comparing to $1,630.5 in U.S. states on
average. All three types of resource revenues per capita – crude oil, natural gas, and coal
– are much lower in Chinese provinces than those in U.S. states. In Chinese provinces,
revenues from crude oil and coal account for 95 percent of the total resource revenue,
whereas in the U.S. states, crude oil and natural gas revenues take up 80 percent of their
total resource revenue. In 1990, average oil and coal reserves in 1990 were larger in
Chinese provinces, while the gas reserve is larger in the U.S. states. On average, the
crude oil first purchase price is ¥465.74 per barrel (about $67.20) in China, which is 50
percent higher than $45.39 per barrel in the U.S. The natural gas wellhead price in China
is 11 percent lower than the $4.04 per thousand cubic feet in the U.S. China average coal
price is ¥383.60 per metric ton (about $56.16), comparing to $30.91 per metric ton in the
U.S.
Turn to growth-related variables. Chinese provinces reached 9.64 percent annual
growth rate of GDP per capita on average, with the average GDP per capita at ¥ 19,015
(about $ 2,784). The average GDP per capita among U.S. states is $ 42,545 with a 2.61
percent average annual growth rate. On average, Chinese provinces hold much lower
statistics in investment share, college population share, R&D expenditure share and
higher number in duty crimes per million persons. The patent numbers are comparable
between two countries. In summary, Chinese provinces are developing economies in
transition with lower resource revenue per capita and higher total resource reserves,
comparing to the U.S. states.
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3.4. Discussion on Comparison Result
Evidence suggests that resource revenues increase the regional growth in both China and
the U.S. with a larger and more statistically significant effect shown across U.S. states.
The booming resources, coal in China, oil and natural gas in the U.S., contribute to the
positive resource – growth relation in the short term. Resource revenues show negative
effects on education attainments and R&D activities while pushing up the investment in
the region.
3.4.1. Resource Effects on Regional Growth
The results from testing the resource and regional growth relation across Chinese
provinces and the U.S. states are summarized in Table 2-5. In turn, I regress four resource
revenue measures – total resource revenue per capita, crude oil revenue per capita,
natural gas revenue per capita, and coal revenue per capita – on the annual growth rate of
GDP per capital. Results from both Fixed Effects (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV)
estimators are reported, where the IV estimator instrument resource revenue measures
with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for
resources respectively. All models in Table 5 include province/state and year fixed
effects, and controls, such as investment share, college share, R&D expenditure share,
patents per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons. The Kleibergen-Paap Fstatistics for the first stage in IV models is well above a rule of thumb of 10 for one
endogenous regressor and one instrument suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), as well
as the 16.38 level suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).
Both countries show evidence that regional GDP per capita growth is increasing in the
resource revenue but are driven by different resources. In China on average, an increase
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of ¥ 1,000 resource revenue per capita will lead to a 0.505 percent higher annual growth
rate of provincial GDP per capita, all else equal (column (2) in panel A Table 2-5). Given
the average resource revenue per capita at ¥ 1,417 and average growth rate of 9.64
percent, the estimated magnitude is small. Regarding elasticity, a one percent increase in
the total resource revenue per capita will result in a 0.07 percent increase in the growth
rate on average. In the U.S., the coefficient of the resource revenue suggests the elasticity
at 0.0044: a one percent increase in the total resource revenue per capita leads to a 0.44
percent increase in state growth rate on average. Increasing resource revenues promote
regional economic growth better in the U.S. than in China. Decompose the total resource
revenue into oil, natural gas, and coal revenues per capita. Only coal revenue shows the
positive and significant effect on growth in China. While in the U.S., the influence comes
from oil and natural gas.
What could make the difference? With energy sectors in China experiencing the
market reform since the 1990s, the less elastic resource effect on growth in China seems
to suggest inefficient extractions of resources due to price control and the state
ownership. Among the three resources, coal market was the first one to take on the
market price reform. The pricing of coal has been liberalized to a great extent in the early
1990s, and “by 1998 coal was, to all intents and purposes, traded on a free market”
(Andrews-Speed 2012, pp168). The privatized, then township and village mines
contribute around 40 percent of total coal production in China. In the case of oil and
natural gas, the crude oil price was linked to international prices through a formula set by
the state in 1998, and natural gas prices continued to be set by the government throughout
the supply chain (Andrews-Speed, 2004). It seems that the impact of a deeper market
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reform on coal has shown in the positive resource effect on regional growth in China. I
will further investigate the policy impacts in section 3.5. Also, the coal production
boomed during 2001 and 2009 with more than 10 percent annual growth (Figure 2-2
panel C). At the similar period, natural gas and oil had received growing higher revenues
in the U.S. owing to the booming unconventional extraction and surging oil and gas
prices in the 2000s. The booming resources seem to stimulate the regional growth.
The resource effect on annual growth rate and long-run growth could be different. The
annual growth captures how the economy responds to fluctuations in resource sectors.
Growth effects from the boom and bust cycle in resource revenues could be asymmetric
and beyond annual impacts. Long-run cross-sectional specifications in literature bear
concerns on omitted variable bias (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; James and Aadland,
2011). I reshape the datasets into 5-year panels to test the resource effect on growth in a
longer term. Table 6 shows the results. The dependent variable is the average annual
growth of every five years, constructed as

1

𝑇𝑇

ln(

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

). The independent variables are

measures of initial years in each panel. The initial resource revenues show positive

effects on 5-year regional growth in both countries, with an increased marginal effect in
China comparing to the annual growth analysis. While coal still drives the result in
China, oil and natural gas revenues lose their contribution to coal in the U.S. With price
drops in natural gas, the natural gas revenue per capital kept declining since 2008 despite
the increasing production. The insignificant result on natural gas in the U.S. could reflect
that resource effects during boom and bust periods were canceled out, leaving no growth
effect on average.
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3.4.2. Resource Effects on Growth-related Factors
Resource revenues can affect regional growth through its influence on growth-related
factors. On the one hand, resource development might push up the fixed assets
investment in a region given that resource sectors are capital intensive. On the other hand,
anticipating a stream of returns from the natural resource, an agent has less desire to
invest in man-made capital for future periods (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006), such as human
capital (Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Weber, 2013) and R&D activities
(Sachs and Warner, 2001). Moreover, resource developments could erode the institution
quality in resource-rich regions because the concentrated production and revenue pattern
related to resource windfalls tend to breed rent-seeking behaviors and harm political
institutions (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Murshed, 2004).
I test and compare resource effects on regional investment, education attainment, R&D
activities, and duty crimes among government officers 25. Replaced the outcome variable
in equation (2) with the investment share, college population share, R&D expenditure
share, patents per thousand people and duty crimes per million people individually, both
Fixed Effects (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators are employed. Table 2-7
shows the results of the total resource revenue effect on the five growth-related factors. In
China, an increase in total resource revenue per capita increases the share of total fixed
asset investment over provincial GDP (the investment share), but decreases the percent of
the total population with a college or higher degree (college share), public R&D

25

Duty crimes are crimes that committed by working personnel in government or state-owned companies,
enterprises, institutions, and organizations, such as corruption, bribery, engaging in malpractices for
personal gain, abuse their powers, and neglect their duties.
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expenditure share, and the number of patents granted per thousand people. The results for
the U.S. are consistent except no significant effect on college population share but
evidence of corruptions per million people increasing in the resource revenue per capita.
Further decompose the resource revenue and the results show patterns as well as
differences across resource types and countries (Table 2-8). With the resource ownership
concentrated in the government (in the case of China) or large energy companies (in the
case of the U.S.), one may speculate that resource rents were channeled away to either
governments or corporation headquarters far from production sites. However, the results
suggest otherwise. Revenues from all resources in both China and the U.S. increase the
investment share in the region, with one exception oil revenue in China (column (1) in
Table 2-8). It implies that resource-rich regions have attracted more investment on fixed
assets in Chinese provinces and more gross private investment in U.S. states. Consistent
negative effects are shown in R&D activities. Across resources and countries, resource
revenues are crowding out R&D expenditure share as well as patents granted (column (3)
and (4) in Table 2-8). Moreover, negative resource effects are larger in China.
Different resource effects are shown on college population share and duty crimes
between two countries. In China, the coal revenue lowers percent of the total population
with a college or higher degree across provinces while it is the natural gas revenue in the
U.S. depresses the educational attainments in states. In a subnational context, two factors
would result in a declining educated population in a region: low educational attainment of
residents and skill-biased migration across regions. While literature shows evidence that
the booming resource extraction reduces high school enrollment (Black et al. 2005;
Cascio and Narayan, 2015), implying resource developments disrupt the formation of
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human capital. I focused on the education attainment measure – percent of the total
population with a college or higher degree – to reveal the outcome of regional human
capital stock considering the skill-biased migration within a nation. In other words,
human capital formation might be crucial in long-run growth for a nation, but given the
mobility across regions within a nation, it is the human capital stock contained in a region
matters in regional growth at the time. Technically, resource extraction requires loweducated physical labor and coal production require more labor than oil or natural gas
production. In the U.S., coal revenues did not show significant impact on college
population share. The results suggest resources with booming production tend to decrease
the education attainment in a region, such as surged production of coal in China and the
shale gas boom in the U.S. Finally, only oil revenues seem to be related to rent seeking
behaviors, such as duty crimes and corruptions, though the sign of the coefficient in
China is not intuitive.
3.5. The China Case
I shift my focus on the China case in this section. I test impacts of three resource-related
policies, the Market Price Reform, the Fiscal Reform, and the Western Development
Strategy, on altering the resource – growth relation across regions.
3.5.1. Market Price Reforms
Market price reforms on coal, crude oil, and natural gas sectors have been rolled out one
after another since 1993 (see Table 2-1 and detailed discussion in 2.2). I explore
variations in policy timings across the three resources and identify the year 1993 and
2003 for coal, and year 1998 for crude oil as potential milestones in shifting the resource
– growth relation. Interactions of resource revenue measures and corresponding policy
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years are then introduced into the instrumental variable (IV) specification shown in
equation (2) and (3). The same specifications with interactions are also employed to
natural gas, which serves as placebo tests.
Table 2-9 summarized the results on testing market price reform impacts. The market
price reform in coal shows significant evidence in stimulating regional growth (column
(1) and (2) in Table 2-9). With a state-set price before 1993, a negative resource effect
shows on the regional growth: an increase of ¥1,000 coal revenue per capita decreases
provincial growth by 0.01 percent. Once the two-track system freed the price of nonutility coals, the marginal effect of the coal revenue on growth becomes positive with
much larger magnitude. As the price reform moved forward and the price of power coals
linked to the market since 2003, the positive effect of the coal revenue on provincial
growth became even larger. Evidence implies the market price reform in coal has
significantly helped to promote a positive resource – growth relation.
On the other hand, the impact of the market price reform on crude oil has not been
significant (column (3) and (4) in Table 2-9). Though the crude oil price has linked to the
international price since 1998, it is still adjusted by the state periodically lagging the
international price. More importantly, the international price reveals market forces in a
world market but omits or underrepresents the demand and supply signal in the domestic
Chinese market. Without market prices negotiated domestically but simply adopting the
international price, resource allocations across regions would be still inferior to the
efficient level. As for the natural gas price, where the state continued to set throughout
the supply chain, no effects are shown with any price policy milestones as expected.
Overall, market price reforms in energy sectors have been shown to be successful for
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coal, need to be deepened in crude oil sectors, and call for actions in the natural gas
sector.
3.5.2. The Fiscal Reform
China adopted a tax-sharing system in 1994, under which the central government
collected a larger share of the major taxes and provincial governments and their localities
split remainders. Meanwhile, with the fiscal decentralization process, the province and
local governments have gained more rights from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
since 1994. Small-scale mines have been privatized. In 2011, a 5 percent resource tax rate
was levied on crude oil and natural gas revenues, while other natural resources, including
coal and other minerals, are still taxed on extracted volumes with the unchanged tax rate
since 1984. For example, resource tax on raw coal is ¥ 2 to 5 per metric ton and ¥ 8 per
metric ton for coking coal (Zhang, 2014). I identify the year 1994 and 2011 to indicate
fiscal reforms and apply similar interaction approach in the IV specification.
Table 2-10 shows the results on testing impacts of the fiscal reform in resource- growth
relations. Evidence suggest that the 1994 fiscal reform did not shift the insignificant
relation between oil, natural gas revenues, and regional growth. Nor did the 2011
resource tax rate change for oil and natural gas. On the other hand, the significant effect
of the year 1994 and 2011 on the coal revenue might be either driven by the privatization
process of small-scale mines since 1994, or the overlap with the market price reform on
coal since 1993. In summary, no convincing evidence is shown to indicate any impact of
the fiscal reform on altering the resource-growth relations across Chinese provinces.
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3.5.3. The Western Development Strategy

I adopt a difference-in-difference specification to test the impact of the Western
Development Strategy in the resource-growth relation. Ten provinces or province
equivalent regions 26 in the Western Development Strategy are identified with the dummy
variable WestPolicy. The period is then divided into before 2000 and since 2000 with the
dummy variable Since2000. I then add three variables into the basic IV specification in
equation (2): two dummy variables WestPolicy, Since2000, and the interaction term of
the resource revenue measure, WestPolicy, and Since2000. Table 11 shows the results.
Coefficients of interaction terms show the average treatment effect of the Western
Development Strategy.
Evidence shows a significant and positive average treatment effect of the Western
Development Strategy is (column (2) in Table 2-11). The total resource revenue increases
provincial growth more in the ten western provinces after the Western Development
Strategy in 2000. A stronger resource – growth relation in western regions after 2000 is
not surprising since the Western Development Strategy focuses on exploiting the
resources in the western provinces more intensively and efficiently. The results are
consistent with Ji, Magnus, and Wang (2014) using a kernel estimator that the Western
Development Strategy has promoted the regional growth through natural gas and coal.

26

It was not 12 because Tibet is not in my sample, and Chongqing municipality is combined into Sichuan
province to be consistent throughout the time period.
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3.6. Conclusions
Using panel data from 1990 to 2015, I compared the effects of resource revenues on the
economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and American
states. To address the endogeneity issue of resource revenues with regional economic
conditions, I employ the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy and instrument the resource
revenue with a product of the resource reserves in 1990 and the national primary energy
prices. The comparison between the two largest energy-producing nations in the world
shed light on the resource – growth relation in distinct economic systems and institution
arrangements.
Evidence suggests that resource revenues increase the regional growth in both China
and the U.S. with a larger and more statistically significant effect shown across U.S.
states. The booming resources, coal in China, oil and natural gas in the U.S., contribute to
the positive resource – growth relation in the short term. However, resource revenues
show negative effects on growth-related factors, such as education attainments and R&D
activities while pushing up the investment across regions. This cast concerns on the longterm economic growth in resource-rich regions.
Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price
reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market
price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the
positive resource effect in China. The Western Development Strategy also show a
positive effect on strength the resource – growth relation in western provinces. On the
other hand, with all natural resources owned by the state and majority managed by the
state-owned enterprises, the fiscal reform does not seem to matter in the resource –
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growth relation in the China case with my results. In summary, evidence point to the
direction that building a market system that relies on efficient price signals for resource
allocation thus promote economic growth.
This study can be extended in several directions. A long panel specification would hint
persistent factors that alter the resource –growth relation, as well as the dynamic between
natural resources and regional institutions in different institution arrangements across
nations. The negative resource effects on educational attainments and R&D activities in
the results suggests a potential reverse of the resource – growth relation in the long-run.
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3.7. Tables in Chapter 3
Table 3-1 Key Resource-related Policy Summary, China
Time
1993

Market Price Reform

Adopted a tax-sharing
system between central
and provincial
government; onshore
resource taxes are
assigned to provincial
government
Crude oil price linked to
the international price
Large-Scale
Development Strategy
for the Western Region
(12 provinces or
equivalent)
- infrastructure to
transfer electricity,
water, and gas from
western to east
- railroad construction

2000

2003

2010

Regional Policy

Coal price: two-track
system for non-utility
coal and power coal

1994

1998

Fiscal Reform

Coal price: abolished its
guidance price for power
coal and set price bands
for negotiations between
coal producers and
electricity generators.
Increase natural gas
wellhead price by
230 m/¥3, making it as
1,150 m/¥3 (about 4.68
$/ft3)

2011

Installed an ad valorem
resource tax of 5% on
oil and natural gas,
instead of taxes levied
on extracted volume
since 1985

Note: Author summarized.
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Table 3-2 1994 Fiscal Reform in China
Central - Province split
ration
(n% : n%)

Share over the total tax
revenue from mining
industry in 2015 (%)

Value-Added Tax

75 : 25

49.27

Income Tax

60 : 40

24.33

Resource Tax

Onshore resources 0 : 100
Offshore resources 100 : 0

15.88

Resource Compensation
Fee

50 : 50

----

Source: Author summarized based on Hou (2016) and Lin (2016).
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Table 3-3 Variable Descriptions
Variable
Resource variables
Resource Revenue per capita
Oil Revenue per capita

Gas Revenue per capita
Coal Revenue per capita
Oil Reserve in 1990 2
Gas Reserve in 1990 2
Coal Reserve in 1990 2
Oil Price
Gas Price
Coal Price
Growth-related variables
GDP per capita Growth
GDP per capita
Investment Share
College Population Share

R&D Expenditure Share

Patent per 1,000 persons

Duty Crimes per million
persons

Definition (China and the U.S.) and Units
Sum of all per capita revenues from crude oil, natural
gas and coal production, 1,000 real currency1 per person
Product of field crude oil production and provincial or
state crude oil first purchase price, 1,000 real currency
per person
Product of natural gas marketed production and
provincial or state natural gas wellhead price, 1,000 real
currency per person
Product of coal production and regional average coal
price, 1,000 real currency per person
Crude oil proved reserves by provinces/states in 1990,
million barrels
Natural Gas, Wet After Lease Separation Proved
Reserves by provinces/states in 1990, billion cubic feet
Recoverable coal reserves by provinces/states in 1990,
million metric tons
National crude oil first purchase price in China and the
U.S., real currency per barrel
National natural gas wellhead price in China and the
U.S.3, real currency per 1,000 cubic feet
National average coal price in China and the U.S., real
currency per metric ton
China
U.S.
The annual growth rate of GDP per capita in 2009 RMB
(Chinese provinces) or in 2009 $ (U.S. states), %
GDP per capita in 2009 RMB or in 2009 $
Percent of gross increase
Percent of gross private
in fixed assets over
investment over GDP 4, %
GDP, %
Percent of total population with a college or higher
degree
Percent of government
R&D expenditure over
Percent of total R&D
government total
expenditure over GDP, %
expenditure, %
The number of utility
The number of patents
patent5 granted per 1,000
granted per 1,000 persons
persons
The number of public
The number of duty
official corruption
crimes6 convicted per
convictions per million
million persons
persons
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Sources: The China annual provincial data are from the China Statistical Yearbook and
the China Economic Information Network (CEINET). The resource data of the U.S.
states are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The U.S. state GDP
data are from the Reginal Economic Accounts, the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The U.S. state level gross private investment. R&D,
patent, and corruption data are taken from Yamarik (2013), National Science
Foundations, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the U.S. Department of Justice.
Note: 1 – all monetary values, e.g. revenues and prices, are in real 2009 currency value.
2
– The reserve data for China are only available since 2003. The reserve values are
constructed using an estimate of the reserves in 1990, obtained by adding extraction
flows from 1990 to 2003 to 2003 reserves.
3
– The data on the wellhead price in the U.S. are only available till 2012. Data for the
year 2013 to 2015 are replaced with Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price.
4
– Yamarik (2013) provided the state gross private investment estimation from 1990 to
2007 in the U.S. State investment share data of 2008 to 2015 are constructed based on
real investment in fixed assets nationwide and the share of the state investment over the
U.S. total investment in 2007.
5
– Utility patent is a type of patent on inventions. Based on the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), more than 90 percent of all patents are utility patents in
2015.
6
– Duty crimes are crimes that committed by working personnel in government or stateowned companies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, such as corruption, bribery,
engaging in malpractices for personal gain, abuse their powers, and neglect their duties.
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Table 3-4 Summary Statistics and Comparison, 1990-2015
China
Unit
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Resource Variables
Resource Revenue per capita
Oil Revenue per capita
Gas Revenue per capita
Coal Revenue per capita
Oil Reserve in 1990
Gas Reserve in 1990
Coal Reserve in 1990
Oil Price
Gas Price
Coal Price
Growth-related variables
GDP per capita Growth
GDP per capita
Investment Share
College Population Share
R&D Expenditure Share
Patent per 1,000 persons
Duty Crimes per Million persons

Mean

Std. Dev.

U.S.
Mean

1,000 ¥ or $ per person
1.42
2.69
1.63
1,000 ¥ or $ per person
0.68
1.83
0.80
1,000 ¥ or $ per person
0.06
0.20
0.52
1,000 ¥ or $ per person
0.67
1.65
0.31
Million barrels
997.70
1,890.88
468.12
Billion cubic feet
2,764.27 5,464.07 2,913.10
Million metric tons
12,047.17 23,022.02 468.52
¥ or $ per barrel
465.74
282.42
45.39
¥ or $ per 1,000 cubic feet
24.44
5.92
4.04
¥ or $ per metric ton
383.60
132.84
30.91
%
¥ or $, real 2009
%
%
%
#
#

9.64
19,015
0.47
6.43
1.27
0.25
43.41

5.43
17,718
0.22
5.75
1.02
0.55
32.96

1.44
42,545
8.51
25.25
2.06
0.25
3.17

Mean Ratio
Std. Dev. (China/U.S.)
4.87
3.30
1.88
1.12
1,459.49
6,987.95
1,035.06
26.33
1.74
6.06

0.13
0.12
0.02
0.32
2.13
0.95
25.71
1.50
0.89
1.80

2.61
9,435
4.02
5.44
1.52
0.19
2.90

6.70
0.07
0.06
0.25
0.62
1.01
13.67

Note: data cover annual measurement from 1990 to 2015; there are 750 observations in China and 1300 observations in the U.S.; all
monetary values, e.g. revenues and prices, are in real 2009 currency value; the mean ratio of monetary value variables are calculated
using the World Bank annual average nominal exchange rate in 2009, that is 1 U.S. dollar = 6.83 Chinese yuan.
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Table 3-5 Resource Effects on Growth of GDP per capita, Annual Panel, 1990-2015

Resource Revenue
[1.42]
Oil Revenue
[0.68]
Gas Revenue
[0.06]
Coal Revenue
[0.67]
Observations
adj. R2
Kleibergen-Paap Fstat (1st Stage)

(1)
(2)
FE
IV
0.153 0.505**
(0.108) (0.200)

725
0.539

725
0.509

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

0.145
(0.164)

-0.093
(0.186)

725
0.538

89.053

725
0.997

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

0.282
(1.174)

0.628
(0.994)

725
0.538

208.808

725
0.517

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

0.154
(0.147)
725
0.539

0.529**
(0.208)
725
0.512

414.396

103.729

Panel B – U.S.
(1)
(2)
FE
IV
***
0.259
0.392***
(0.052) (0.147)

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

Resource Revenue
[1.63]
Oil Revenue
0.319*** 0.426**
[0.80]
(0.043) (0.187)
Gas Revenue
0.200*** 0.308***
[0.52]
(0.060) (0.119)
Coal Revenue
0.110 -0.204
[0.31]
(0.236) (0.597)
N
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
2
adj. R
0.434
0.401
0.433
0.969
0.405
0.378
0.400
0.370
Kleibergen-Paap
27.274
28.098
77.085
93.943
F-stat (1st Stage)
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China and 1.44 % in the U.S.;
variable means are listed in [ ] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates of
resource revenues are summarized; IV columns instrument resource revenue measures
with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for all
resources, and crude oil, natural gas and coal respectively. Province/state and year fixed
effects, and controls, including investment share, college share, R&D expenditure share,
patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons are included. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent
level, *** at 1 percent level.
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Table 3-6 Resource Effects on Regional Growth, Five-year Panels, 1990-2015

Resource
Revenue
[1.34]
Oil Revenue
[0.64]
Gas Revenue
[0.06]
Coal Revenue
[0.63]
Observations
R2
KleibergenPaap F-stat (1st
Stage)

(1)
FE
0.216

(2)
IV
0.668***

(0.135)

(0.203)

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

-0.005 -0.332
(0.167) (0.243)
0.772
0.647
(1.510) (1.153)

145
0.712

145
0.575

145
0.701

14.183

145
0.605

145
0.703

17.668

145
0.621

0.458*** 0.698***
(0.110) (0.213)
145
145
0.723
0.639

98.844

22.322

Panel B – U.S.

Resource
Revenue
[1.61]
Oil Revenue
[0.79]
Gas Revenue
[0.51]
Coal
Revenue
[0.30]
Observations
R2
KleibergenPaap F-stat
(1st Stage)

(1)
(2)
FE
IV
0.173*** 0.231***
(0.062)

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

(0.081)
0.260*** 0.394*
(0.093) (0.217)
0.109** 0.025
(0.052) (0.083)
0.557*** 0.866***

250
0.653

250
0.554

250
0.659

17.962

250
0.551
8.989

250
0.610

250
0.503
25.740

(0.104)
250
0.613

(0.256)
250
0.507
153.187

Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.08 % in China and 1.39 % in the U.S.; variable
means are listed in [] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates of resource revenues are
summarized; IV columns instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource
reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for all resources, and crude oil, natural gas and
coal respectively. Province/state and year fixed effects, and controls, including investment share,
college share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million
persons are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent
level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.

76

Table 3-7 Resource Effects on Growth Factors, All resources
Panel A – China

Resource Revenue
[1.42]
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Dependent Variable Mean
Observations
R2
Kleibergen-Paap
F-stat (1st Stage)
Panel B – U.S.

Resource Revenue
[1.63]

Investment Share
(1)
(2)
FE
IV

College Share
(3)
(4)
FE
IV

R&D Share
(5)
(6)
FE
IV

Patent
(7)
FE

(8)
IV

Duty Crime
(9)
(10)
FE
IV

0.012* 0.014*** -0.083 -0.141*** -0.109*** -0.135*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.494 0.115
(0.007) (0.003) (0.101) (0.042)
(0.036)
(0.014)
(0.022)
(0.008) (1.108) (0.723)

725
0.834

0.47
725
0.826
96.333

Investment Share
(1)
(2)
FE
IV

725
0.898

6.43
725
0.893
96.333

College Share
(3)
(4)
FE
IV

725
0.589

1.27
725
0.568

725
0.710

96.333
R&D Share
(5)
(6)
FE
IV

0.25
725
0.698
96.333

Patent
(7)
FE

(8)
IV

725
0.552

43.41
725
0.531
96.333

Corruptions
(9)
(10)
FE
IV

0.134 0.383*** -0.069** -0.055 -0.023** -0.025** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.071 0.320*
(0.119) (0.126) (0.032) (0.163) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002)
(0.003) (0.102) (0.171)

Dependent Variable Mean
8.51
25.25
2.06
0.25
3.17
Observations
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
1250
R2
0.637
0.603
0.663
0.649
0.144
0.108
0.302
0.269
0.024
0.115
Kleibergen-Paap
33.319
33.319
33.319
33.319
33.319
F-stat (1st Stage)
Note: variable means are listed in [ ] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates of resource revenues are summarized; IV
columns instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for all
resources, and crude oil, natural gas and coal respectively. Province/state and year fixed effects, and controls are included. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.

Table 3-8 Resource Effects on Growth Factors, Oil vs. Natural Gas vs. Coal, IV
specifications

China

U.S.

(1)
Investment
Share

(2)
College
Share

(3)
R&D
Share

(4)

Oil Revenue
[0.68]

0.0001
(0.003)

0.048
(0.053)

-0.119***
(0.019)

-0.037***
(0.008)

-5.497***
(1.205)

Gas Revenue
[0.06]

0.075**
(0.033)

0.046
(0.482)

-1.019***
(0.166)

-0.540***
(0.099)

1.955
(3.572)

Coal Revenue
[0.67]

0.015***
(0.003)

-0.160***
(0.044)

-0.133***
(0.016)

-0.067***
(0.008)

0.913
(0.744)

Oil Revenue
[0.80]

0.563***
(0.171)

-0.076
(0.206)

-0.047***
(0.014)

-0.014***
(0.005)

0.380*
(0.220)

Gas Revenue
[0.52]

0.448***
(0.125)

-0.214***
(0.072)

0.036
(0.026)

-0.005***
(0.002)

0.163
(0.194)

Coal Revenue
[0.31]

3.175***
(0.564)

0.096
(0.273)

-0.211***
(0.044)

-0.037***
(0.008)

0.523
(0.518)

Patent

Note: variable means are listed in [ ] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates
of specific resource revenues with Instrumental Variable models are summarized, which
instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and
the national resource prices for crude oil, natural gas, and coal respectively.
Province/state and year fixed effects, and controls, including investment share, college
share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million
persons, are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10
percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.
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(5)
Duty
Crime

Table 3-9 The China Case – Market Price Reform Impacts

CoalRevenue
CoalRevenue*Year1993-2002
CoalRevenue*Since2003
OilRevenue
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OilRevenue*Since1998
GasRevenue
GasRevenue*Year1993-2002
GasRevenue*Since2003
GasRevenue*Since1998

(1)
(2)
FE
IV
-0.009** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.005)
8.650** 7.807**
(3.793) (3.876)
9.013** 10.451**
(4.280) (4.841)

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

-0.026
(0.022)

-0.088
(0.057)

0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
-1.853 -0.706
(1.095) (1.384)
-0.078*
-0.137
(0.041)
(0.166)
87.688** 90.492
(41.655) (159.273)
78.310* 136.177
(41.118) (165.228)

26.066
88.295
(22.196) (56.543)
Observations
725
725
725
725
725
725
725
725
R2
0.546
0.523
0.540
0.517
0.550
0.506
0.540
0.503
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st Stage)
11.487
53.478
17.344
26.761
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China; Year1993-2002 = 1 if year is between 1993 and 2002; Since2003 =
1 if year is 2003 or later; Since1998 = 1 if year is 1998 or later; point estimates of resource revenues are summarized; IV columns
instrument resource specific revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for coal
and crude oil respectively; province/state and year fixed effects, and controls, including investment share, college share, R&D
expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons are included. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.

Table 3-10 The China Case – the Fiscal Reform Impacts

OilRevenue
OilRevenue*Year1994-2010
OilRevenue*Since2011

(1)
(2)
FE
IV
0.365
0.304
(2.399) (3.530)
-0.193 -0.306
(2.409) (3.426)
-0.230 -0.452
(2.400) (3.448)

GasRevenue

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

-5.562**
(2.433)
5.950**
(2.435)
5.554**
(2.442)
725
0.547

-5.057**
(2.446)
5.972**
(2.320)
5.033**
(2.394)
725
0.521
26.464

-51.400 -18.067
(35.131) (99.510)
52.200
19.978
(35.371) (99.074)
51.409
18.132
(35.099) (99.366)

GasRevenue*Year1994-2010
GasRevenue*Since2011
CoalRevenue
CoalRevenue*Year1994-2010
CoalRevenue*Since2011

Observations
725
725
725
725
R2
0.537
0.514
0.544
0.520
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st
42.623
16.832
Stage)
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China; Year1994-2010 = 1 if
year is between 1994 and 2010; Since2011 = 1 if year is 2011 or later; IV columns
instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and
the national resource prices for all resources; Province/state and year fixed effects, and
controls, including investment share, college share, R&D expenditure share, patent per
1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons are included. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1
percent level.
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Table 3-11 The China Case – West Development Policy Impacts

ResourceRevenue
ResourceRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000
OilRevenue
OilRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000
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GasRevenue
GasRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000

(1)
FE
0.003
(0.121)
0.313**
(0.145)

(2)
IV
-0.404
(0.358)
1.280***
(0.334)

(3)
FE

(4)
IV

0.093
(0.118)
-0.063
(0.200)

-0.272
(0.167)
0.265
(0.237)

(5)
FE

(6)
IV

-16.322*
(9.872)
17.294*
(9.828)

-31.426
(19.441)
32.618*
(19.106)

CoalRevenue
CoalRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000
WestPolicy
Since2000
Observations
R2
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st Stage)

-1.862*** -3.215*** -1.226** -1.277*** -1.367*** -1.403***
(0.482)
(0.594) (0.476) (0.482)
(0.474)
(0.481)
5.148*** 5.151*** 5.168*** 5.235*** 5.113*** 5.037***
(0.553)
(0.559) (0.552) (0.548)
(0.541)
(0.554)
725
725
725
725
725
725
0.218
0.155
0.206
0.198
0.212
0.208
77.772
230.668
38.831

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

-0.499*
-0.534
(0.278)
(0.393)
1.120*** 1.692***
(0.301)
(0.450)
-2.181*** -2.868***
(0.472)
(0.517)
5.209*** 5.219***
(0.551)
(0.560)
725
725
0.235
0.218
55.102

Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China; WestPolicy = 1 if provinces are in the West Development Policy; Since2000 =
1 if year is 2000 or later; point estimates of resource revenues are summarized; IV columns instrument resource revenue measures with the product
of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for resources respectively; province/state and year fixed effects, and controls are
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.

3.8. Figures in Chapter 3
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Figure 3-1 Total Primary Energy Production by Resource Types, China vs. the U.S.
Note: Author conducted based on data from China Statistic Year Book and the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA).

82

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

million metric tons
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

billion cubic feet

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

million barrels

Panel A Crude Oil Production
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

China

China

China

83

U.S.

Panel B Natural Gas Production

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

U.S.

Panel C Coal Production

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

U.S.

Figure 3-2 Three Main Resource Production Comparisons: China vs. the U.S.
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Figure 3-3 Resource Reserves in 1990 Comparison: China vs. the U.S.
Note: Author conducted based on data from China Statistic Year Book and the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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Figure 3-4 Three Main Resource Price Comparisons: China vs. the U.S. vs. the World
Sources: China Statistic Year Book, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
and the World Bank Commodity Price Data (“the pink sheet”).
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Figure 3-5 Regional Development Strategies in China
Source: Map of Chinese economic regions, based on File:China_provinces_blank.svg.
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Chapter 4 The Effects of the Recent Oil and Gas Boom on Schooling Decisions in
the U.S.
4.1. Introduction
Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies have induced an oil and gas
drilling boom in the U.S. since the 2000s, which has had demonstrated impacts on local
income, employment and wage increases (Weber 2012 and 2013; Weinstein 2014; Allcott
and Keniston 2014; Fetzer 2014). Combined with the vast literature showing technology
breakthroughs are often associated with rises in the returns to skilled labor (Goldin and
Katz 1996; Galor and Tsiddon 1997; Acemoglu 1998; Acemoglu 2002), makes it
tempting to conclude that schooling will rise with the arrival of an energy boom.
However, such an inference ignores the fact that many new jobs related to the energy
boom are task-skill based – meaning that education and work experience requirements for
entry are low – and have the potential to raise the opportunity cost of schooling
significantly. During energy boom periods, increased demand for and earnings of taskskill labor with low education requirements could widen the wage differential and
increase the opportunity cost of staying in school, thus drawing teenagers out of school
(Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005b; Emery, Ferrer and Green 2012). This paper
exploits variation in timing and spatial patterns of oil and gas well drilling activities to
confirm the negative boom-schooling relation across 15 U.S. states between 2000 and
2013.
The schooling impacts of the recent shale oil and gas boom are of interest for several
reasons. First, conventional thought among policy-makers is that the boom benefits the
economy with jobs and enhances U.S. efforts to achieve energy independence. The
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major concerns so far lie in potential environmental degradation through water pollution,
air pollution, congestion, and ecosystem changes (Kargbo, Wilhelm and Campbell 2010;
Roy, Adams and Robinson 2014; Rozell and Reaven 2011; Parker et al. 2014). Second,
human capital has long been recognized as an important factor to economic growth
(Lucas 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992) and a main channel causing the resource
curse (Gylfason 1999; Stijns 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004), which observes low
economic growth in resource-rich regions. Therefore, understanding the particular
schooling impacts of the energy boom is important for designing development policies
that can increase short-run growth rates without trading off long-run education levels.
New job opportunities driven by the energy boom may have two offsetting effects. On
the one hand, when the energy boom brings skill-biased jobs and increases the earnings
of task-skill labor, it increases the opportunity costs of staying in school – the local labor
market channel. On the other hand, the energy boom may increase school resources
through increasing the local tax base, thus increasing student retention – the school
resource channel. Which effect dominates during periods of energy boom is an empirical
question.
This study exploits county and year variation in drilling activities across 1170 counties
in 15 oil/gas production states between 2000 and 2013. The instrumental variable
approach with various fixed effects provides estimates of how this recent oil and gas
boom affected high school enrollment at the county level. The evidence shows that grade
9 to 12 enrollment decreases in counties and years with intensive drilling activities. The
magnitudes I find suggest that for every four oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000
laborers, one student out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in grade
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11 and 12 on average. In other words, given that the drilling density is 7.58 and that total
count of grade 11 and 12 enrolled students is 1,962 in an average county during a year,
about 36 fewer students per county and overall 41,760 fewer students across the 15 states
enrolled in grade 11 and 12 with the energy boom.
The results are consistent with the findings in the literature exploring the 1970s energy
boom (Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005b). Closest to this paper, Cascio and Narayan
(2015) find fracking has increased high school dropout rates of male teens across the U.S.
at the commute zone level since 2005. This paper improves on these studies by drawing
on rich well drilling data at an annual frequency that both identifies the location, timing,
and intensity of the oil and gas boom and allows me to explore heterogeneous effects.
4.2. Background and Related Literature
4.2.1. The Energy Boom, Drilling Activities, and Local Impact Literature
Since the 2000s, oil and gas extraction has rapidly increased from shale formations.
Compared to conventional gas deposits, which are in permeable rocks typically located
much closer to the surface, shale deposits are trapped in fine-grained sedimentary rocks
with very low permeability and located 1,000 to 13,500 feet below the surface (Joskow
2013). When used in conjunction with horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing 27 enables
gas producers to extract shale gas economically. The Barnett shale play in the middle
north of Texas became the first production shale gas play when Mitchell Energy made it

27

Hydraulic fracturing (commonly called "fracking") is a technique in which water, chemicals, and sand
are pumped into the well to unlock the hydrocarbons trapped in shale formations by opening cracks
(fractures) in the rock and allowing natural gas to flow from the shale into the well. Simply, fracking is the
production of natural gas from shale rock by bombarding it with water and chemicals.
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commercially viable by getting costs down to $4 per million British Thermal Units in
1998.
When cost-reducing technologies, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
techniques in this case, met the higher prices of crude oil in the early 2000s, the shale gas
industry surged. U.S. shale gas production increased by 14-fold from 2000 to 2010, and
the production mostly lies in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and a major field
that covers much of the Northeast (centered on Pennsylvania) called the Marcellus shale.
Based on the well record data collected from various state agencies, figure 1 shows the
time trend of the oil/gas well drilling activities in 15 oil and gas production states in the
U.S. since 1900. In general, the 2000s energy boom is significant from a historical
perspective yet not as intense as the 1970s-1980s boom. Traditional oil and gas states
such as Texas and Oklahoma still dominate drilling activities. In Texas, oil/gas well
drilling peaked at 30,670 wells drilled in 1985 and the recent boom featured a high of
23,200 oil/gas wells drilled in 2012. However, in some states, the recent energy boom is
more sizable in comparison to the 1970s-1980s boom, such as Pennsylvania, North
Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah. In Pennsylvania, 2,276 oil/gas wells were drilled
when the last energy boom was at its highest in 1984, whereas more than 4,000 oil/gas
wells were drilled annually from 2006 to 2008.
Local impact studies have documented the recent energy boom as a local economic
shock with employment and wage increases. Based on input-output models in earlier
economic analyses, development of Marcellus shale was found to create more than
44,000 jobs in 2009 and more than 139,000 in 2010 ( Considine, Watson and Blumsack
2009 and 2010). In the Barnett Shale near Fort Worth, Texas, the shale development was
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estimated to account for almost 89,000 jobs (Perryman Group 2007, 2008, 2011). Later
studies have questioned these results as overestimating the employment effect, with
concern for the potential violation of critical assumptions and the industry funding
source. Kelsey et al. (2011) used survey and GIS data to refine an input-output analysis
and showed that Marcellus shale development in Pennsylvania created or supported about
23,884 total jobs in 2009, which was half of what Considine et al.(2009) estimated.
Utilizing the moratorium and later ban on fracking in New York as a natural experiment
in the Marcellus region, Komarek (2016) found total employment and wages per job
increased by 7% and 11% respectively above pre-boom levels in the three years after the
boom. The results also show significant positive spillovers to related sectors, such as
construction, transportation, retail trade, and accommodations. Employment increases
associated with drilling are also found in Ohio (Weinstein and Partridge 2011), Colorado,
Wyoming, and Texas (Weber 2012), the southwest four-state region of Texas, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Oklahoma (Weber 2013), nine states in the central U.S. (Brown 2014), and
in the lower 48 states altogether (Weinstein 2014). In the synthesis of the literature on
local labor markets and natural resources, Marchand and Weber (2017) concluded that
the growth in resource extraction clearly increases employment. Created jobs spill over to
other sectors of the local economy, which were estimated as the job multiplier, varying
from 0.3 to 3.37 in literature (Marchand and Weber 2017).
The workforce relevant to recent oil and natural gas development can be distinguished
from that of most other sectors. First, the drilling and production processes are much
more labor intensive and industrial in nature than conventional shallow gas development.
The deeper formation requires directional drilling, production stimulation, and other
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methods to produce commercial quantities of natural gas (Brundage, Kelsey and Lobdell
2011). Between 320 and 1365 heavy equipment truck trips are required to build out and
bring a single well into operation (Moss 2008), implying that significant labor demand
spills over in transportation and construction. A U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report in
2013 documented that employment grew by 27,954 jobs from 2007 to 2011 in the
counties with wells in the Bakken Formation (North Dakota and Montana), of which
38.1% were in mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 17.5 % were in
transportation and warehousing, and 12.9% were in construction (Ferree and Smith
2013).
Second, the drilling stage is the most labor demanding phase and is associated with the
most inducement of local economic activities. Once a well is put into production, the
workforce used in the process of drilling and the affiliated infrastructure construction will
no longer be needed. A workforce needs assessment conducted in Pennsylvania
(Brundage, Kelsey and Lobdell 2011) indicated that 80% of the total industry workforce
would be required during the well drilling phase, with 18% for the pre-drilling phase and
only 2% for the production phase after wells are drilled. Comparing the oil and gas
production trend with related employment trends in 20 states, Weinstein (2014) also
showed the employment growth that had accompanied the boom during the construction
and drilling period immediately preceded the boom in production. Thus, the drilling
phase period is often referred to as “the boom” in the oil and natural gas industries due to
the high and sudden labor demand to perform tasks associated with natural gas
development (Brundage, Kelsey and Lobdell 2011).
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Third, when drilling activities were steady, the drill-related workforces were often
transient workers who maintained temporary residency in the drilling area. With the large
reserve and technology breakthrough of shale oil and gas, the development intensity kept
increasing over the course of years. As a result, the industry is moving towards a
workforce that contains fewer transient workers and more permanent local residents. For
example, national and international drilling companies, as well as gas field service and
construction firms, have opened regional offices in the southwest and northeast
Pennsylvania due to the development of the Marcellus play (Brundage, Kelsey and
Lobdell 2011). In addition, drill-related workforces spill over into boom-related labor
demand in local services such as retail trade and accommodations, reinforcing the local
impacts of the energy boom.
Finally, the local labor demand related to the energy boom is task-skill biased with low
education and work experience needed for entry. Among the ten largest occupations in
the mining sector, most occupations require less than high school or high school diploma
or equivalent degree, and none require working experience, except petroleum engineers
and general and operations managers (Appendix A 3.1, panel A). Looking at the
education attainment for workers 25 years and older in these occupations, such as
roustabouts, service unit operators, heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers, rotary drill
operators, 18% to 26% of the workers have less than a high school diploma, which is
twice to three times the average rate for all occupations at 9.6% (Appendix A 3.1, panel
B). In spill-over sectors such as retail and accommodations, the requirements are low as
well. It is fair to conclude that this energy boom increases the demand for low-skilled
labor.

93

In summary, driven by the technology change, an energy boom has intensively spread
across the U.S. along shale formations. This energy boom stimulates local economic
activities, especially employment. The labor demand triggered by the energy boom is
largest during the drilling phase and favors task-skilled labors with lower education
requirements.
4.2.2. Energy Shocks and Schooling
Human capital has long been recognized as an important factor for economic growth, and
crowding out human capital development (e.g., education) may be a major cause of the
resource curse, the phenomenon of low economic growth in resource-rich regions
(Gylfason 2001; Stijns 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). Due to the low demand for a
high-skilled labor force in resource sectors, the return to education declines with a
resource boom (Gylfason 2001), which further decreases the incentive for educational
investment. Gylfason (2001) showed evidence that public expenditure on education
relative to national income, expected years of schooling for girls, and gross secondaryschool enrollment is all inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth
across countries.
In a subnational context, labor mobility among regions suggests analyzing this effect in
two aspects: the high demand for task-skilled labor force can be filled either with
immigrants to the boom region or with local laborers, including teens of high school age.
Since the labor demand during the energy boom is biased towards low-skilled laborers,
the former will reduce the average education attainment level in the region while the
latter could block human capital accumulation by inducing more dropouts. In this study, I
focus on the latter schooling effects.
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Evidence shows that energy shocks influence schooling decisions. Black, McKinnish,
and Sanders (2005b) utilized the substantial variation in wages available to teenagers in
the Appalachian coal boom and bust and found that high school enrollment rates in
Kentucky and Pennsylvania declined considerably in the 1970s during the coal boom and
increased in the 1980s during the bust in coal-producing counties relative to counties
without coal. The estimates indicated that a long-term 10 percent increase in the earnings
of low-skilled workers could decrease high school enrollment rates by 5 to 7 percent.
Focusing on the oil boom between 1970 and 1980 and college education, Kumar (2014)
showed that the cohort reaching high school age during the oil boom was about 2
percentage points less likely to have a college degree by the time they turned 34 to 37
years of age in 2000. In the context of Canada, Emery, Ferrer and Green (2012) analyzed
the effect of the OPEC oil shocks during 1973 to 1981 on the long-term human capital
investments for Alberta birth cohorts and found that resource booms may delay education
but do not reduce the total accumulation of human capital.
Most recent studies have explored the boom-schooling relation in the context of the
energy boom since the 2000s. Morissette, Chan and Lu (2015) exploited variation in
wage growth in Canada induced by increases in world oil prices from 2001 to 2008 and
found that the aggregate increased wages tend to reduce young men’s full-time university
enrollment rates but showed little evidence of an effect on high school dropouts. Cascio
and Narayan (2015) showed that fracking had increased high school dropout rates of
male teens across the U.S. at the commute zone level. Observing all primary and
secondary school students and teacher quality in Texas school districts, Marchand and
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Weber (2015) found that the shale boom slightly decreased student achievement with
teacher turnover and inexperience increased.
4.3. Economics of the Schooling Decision
In the classical theory by Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964), schooling decisions are
modeled as an investment decision. As summarized in Black, McKinnish and Sanders
(2005b): If person j does not enroll in high school, the discounted value of the flow of
𝑤𝑤

earnings is 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 (1+𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 )𝑡𝑡, where 𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 is the earnings of a high school dropout at time
𝑗𝑗

t and 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 is person j’s discount rate. If instead person j enrolls in school k more years to
complete high school, the present value of the flow of earnings of person j is 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =
∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑘𝑘
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. Assuming that secondary public education is free, the student will complete

school if 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . That is
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Under this model, the schooling decision is mainly determined by three factors: the
wage differential between high school graduates and high school dropouts (𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 − 𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ),

the opportunity cost of a high school education (𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ), and the individual discount rate 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 .

Two channels – the local labor market and school resources – further link the schooling

decision with the energy boom in the rational investment decision framework. The local
impacts of energy booms on employment and earnings can be large and can spill over
into other local sectors (Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005a; Marchand 2012). In
studies of the expansion of oil and gas drilling into shale formations in the 2000s, the
estimates of new local jobs attributable to the energy boom range from 220,000 to
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618,000 nationwide (Maniloff and Mastromonaco 2015; Cascio and Narayan 2015).
Spillover effects have also been documented, finding that each oil and gas sector job
creates around one to three jobs in other local sectors, especially in construction and
transportation (Brown 2014; Fetzer 2014; Weber 2013; Marchand and Weber 2017). As
discussed, the labor demand related to the energy boom is low-skill or task-skill biased.
When demand for and the earnings of low-skilled labor increase with the energy boom,
the opportunity cost of staying in school increases and the wage differential between a
dropout and graduate of high school shrinks. Because the wage differential is positively
related to the enrollment decision and opposite for the opportunity cost, the resource
boom is predicted to affect school enrollment negatively.
School resources, such as school revenues, are another channel linking the energy
boom with schooling (Marchand and Weber 2015). The energy development could
expand the local tax base, such as the property tax base, and directly generate revenue for
schools (Weber, Burnett, and Xiarchos 2016), or it may increase revenue to the state
government, which is then redistributed to schools (Raimi and Newell 2014). On the
contrary, disamenities from energy extraction might have reduced property values
(Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2013) and possibly shrink the local tax base. Nonetheless,
school resources may affect student achievements, and thus schooling decisions (Gibbons
and Mcnally 2013; Papke 2005; Unnever, Kerckhoff and Robinson 2000).
Therefore, depending on the relative forces through two channels, the impact of the
energy boom on the schooling decision leaves as an empirical question.
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4.3.1. Data
I construct a panel dataset of 1170 counties in 15 oil and gas production states, covering
the period between 2000 and 2013. The 15 states are those that overlay the shale plays
based on the most recent digital map by the Energy Information Administration and the
U.S. Geological Survey in 2011 (see Figure 3-2). More specifically, the sampled states
are New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky on Marcellus shale play,
Michigan on Antrim shale play, Arkansas on Fayetteville play, Oklahoma on Woodford
and other plays, Louisiana on Haynesville shale play, Texas on Barnett, Eagle Ford, and
part of Haynesville play, North Dakota and Montana on Bakken play, and Wyoming,
Utah, and Colorado on other scattered plays. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), the Marcellus play (PA, WV, OH and NY) on average produced
9.9 billion cubic feet per day in 2013, making it the most productive shale play in the
U.S. The Haynesville play (LA & TX) and the Barnett play (TX) produced 5.02 and 4.64
billion cubic feet per day each, coming as second and third in shale gas production. The
oil and gas production in these 15 states constitutes 82.70% of the overall production in
the U.S. in 2010, increasing from 67.25% in 2000.
4.3.2. Identify the Energy Boom
Four types of indicators have been applied in the literature to identify the energy boom:
energy reserves, energy production, employment in the energy industry, and drilling
activities measured by the number of wells drilled. If local labor demand shocks are
indeed the mechanism linking the energy boom to teenage schooling decisions, it is ideal
to have an employment measure that counts both the direct employment effects in the
energy industry and the spillover employment effects from the energy development, such
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as in construction, transportation, services, and the retail sector. However, the overall
employment effects related to energy boom are difficult to measure. Without an accurate
direct employment measure, the timing of a boom is better identified when the measure
identifies the phase of energy development with the largest local employment effects.
The initial drilling phase shows the highest labor requirements, compared to the mature
production phase (Weinstein 2014; Kelsey, Partridge and White 2016). Brundage, Kelsey
and Lobdell (2011) assessed that each wet gas well in southwest Pennsylvania requires
the equivalent of 13.1 full-time jobs, spread across almost 150 occupations and 420
individuals, during the year when drilling and well completion occur on the well site, but
only 0.18 full-time job equivalents during each of that well’s subsequent producing years.
Kelsey et al. (2011) further concluded that labor requirements and therefore most of the
employment-based effects are highest during the active drilling years and largely are
driven by the number of wells drilled per year. Therefore, a production measure will
more likely lag the boom in employment requirements. While the energy reserve is
arguably the most exogenous measure among the four, the lack of time variation makes it
difficult to identify the timing of a boom. With drilling activities highly related to
exogenous factors such as energy deposits distribution across the country, the measure of
newly drilled well counts identifies the location, timing, duration and, finally, the
intensity of the oil and gas development.
Comprehensive well records, including the timing and location of drilling for each oil
and gas well, are requested from various state agencies 28. Based on the spud date – the

28

State agencies such as Dept. of Natural Resource, Dept. of Environment Protect/Commission, Industrial
Commission (ND, OK), and Geological Survey (AR, KY).
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day that the drilling starts for a well – in well records, I then constructed the number of
oil and gas wells drilled, the well spud, by year by county. Since a newly drilled well will
have much more muted effects on local labor market conditions in a large county than in
a small rural county, I further divide the well spud by the number of the labor force. As
labor force counts may be endogenous to drilling activities, I use the labor force of the
initial sample period in 2000. Equation (1) shows the main identification variable: the
drilling density, which is the number of oil and gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers
by county (c) by year (t).
(1)

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =

𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 1,000 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐,2000

This unique drilling measure displays significant temporal and spatial variation within
the energy boom. Figure 3 shows the time trends of average drilling density across the
sample. In general, drilling activities took off after 2002 until the Great Recession in
2008 and surged again after 2009. Beyond averages, there are significant differences in
the timing of drilling in booming counties. The fast growing activity since 2010 is mostly
driven by top drilling counties in Texas and North Dakota. While in Pennsylvania, the
drilling activities began in earnest around 2006 and 2007. Some counties saw a peak of
the boom around 2005, e.g. Johnson County in Wyoming or Yuma County in Colorado,
while a few counties boomed around 2000, e.g. Campbell County in Wyoming or Terrell
County in Texas 29.

29

Since the drill density measure counts both conventional and unconventional oil and gas well, it is not
surprising to see the early 2000s boom. Conventional and unconventional drillings are correlated and both
could trigger demand shock in local labor markets. I argue that there is no reason to distinguish them in this
study.
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Figure 3-4 further compares the spatial variation of the drilling density across all
sample counties in the year 2000 and 2013. In 2000, 555 counties, about 47% of the
sample, did not experience any oil/gas well drilling. The number of zero drilling counties
increases to 687 in 2013. Meanwhile, the oil and gas drillings became enormously intense
and highly concentrated in a few areas. In both 2000 and 2013, drilling densities at the
90th percentile are around 7 to 8 wells per initial 1,000 labors. Then they surged to about
86 wells in 2000 and 197 wells at the 99th percentile. In the densest drilling county, Love
county in Texas, the drilling density increased from 265 well drilled per 1,000 labors in
2000 to 3,857 well drilled per 1,000 labors in 2013, indicating almost 15 times increase.
The top 1% counties – 117 counties – were drilling hundreds of more times than the other
counties. These top drilling counties in 2013 were concentrated in south and southwest of
Texas, the border corner among Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado, and west of North
Dakota.
4.3.3. Schooling Decisions in High School and Controls
I focus on grade 11 to 12 high school enrollment to measure aggregated schooling
decisions of high schoolers by county by year. Age 16 to 18 is the exposure age period to
low-skill job opportunities. In the U.S., the Fair Labor Standards Act allows teenagers
aged 14 to 15 to work outside school hours and teenagers aged 16 to 17 to work
unlimited hours 30. The compulsory school attendance law varies by state and ends from

30

Fair Labor Standards Act listed Mining as hazardous job that teenage age 14 to 17 should not work in.
However, I argue that with a local labor demand shock triggered by drilling, low-skill job opportunities are
not only in mining but also in non-tradable sectors like service and retails.
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age 16 to 18 (Table 2-5). Thus, grade 11 to 12 high schoolers provides a feasible age
group to investigate the boom-schooling relation.
I obtain the main outcome variable, the enrollment count of grade 11 and 12, from the
Common Core of Data (CCD) by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). I
prefer the Common Core of Data (CCD) to household survey data because the sample
size of either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey
(CPS) prevents accurate estimates in rural areas, such as locals where the population is
under 65,000. This is important because most of the natural gas production takes place in
nonmetro-noncore counties where the population is less than 20,000 (Brown, Weber, and
Wojan 2013). Given that it is a universe data collection from administrative records in
state education agencies, the data is relatively accurate and reliable without sampling
errors. However, the limitations are the omission of data on private schools, and the data
can be sensitive to student mobility patterns. The student mobility issue needs special
attention in this study because when a resource boom draws immigrants from outside the
region, the local high school enrollment could increase. Thus, the schooling measures
based on CCD could be overestimated due to the migrant effect 31.
Drawing on the review of Rumberger and Lim (2008), I further identify three sets of
control variables that may affect schooling at the high school level in the U.S.: schooling
conditions, e.g. pupil-teacher ratio, total revenue per student, total expenditure per
student, percentage school revenue from local funding sources; economic conditions, e.g.

31

There are observations with the calculated enrollment rate and/or the AFGR greater than 100%. It could
be due to migrant effect or other measurement error. In the proceeding empirical analysis, I imputed those
greater-than-100% observations with 100%.
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median household income, income per capita, poverty rate, job numbers, unemployment
rate, earnings per job; and demographic measures, e.g. population density, population
share of black, Hispanic, senior, and crime rate. All schooling condition data are from
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). I gather other county-level control data
from the Census Bureau’s U.S. Counties database. The U.S. Counties database pulls
together various databases from the federal government and summarizes key information
at the county level 32. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the data.
4.4. Empirical Model
4.4.1. Empirical Specification
In order to determine the impact of drilling activities on the schooling of grade 11 and 12,
I regress high school enrollment on oil and gas related well-drilling density:
(2)

𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜸𝜸′ 𝑿𝑿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the natural logarithm of the grade 11 and 12 enrollment count in county c state s in
year t. An alternative measure, grade 9 to 12 enrollment rate, is also used to check

robustness. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the number of oil and gas wells drilled per initial 1,000

laborers in county c state s in year t. I then include county fixed effects, 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 , and state-byyear fixed effect, 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , where s indexes the state. Observed time-variant variables are

controlled in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , as listed in detail in the end of session 4.3.3. 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 represents all
remaining unobserved determinants of outcomes. The county fixed effects account for
unobserved determinants of schooling that are common to the same county over time.

32

Unfortunately, the U.S. Counties database terminated in 2009. I traced to the original data sources to
update the data through 2013.
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State-by-year fixed effects control for the general schooling trend and shocks to all
counties, as well as the state-level shocks, such as changes in state education policy or
other aggregate economic development.
The empirical strategy compares the average high school enrollment during time
periods when oil and gas wells are drilled intensively to time periods in the same county
when it did not receive such a shock. I flexibly control for time trend using schooling in
counties where no drilling activities are observed during others’ booming periods. I now
turn to discussing the potential threats to the identification and present an instrumentation
strategy.
4.4.2. Threats to Identification and Instrumentation Strategy
I discuss three econometric concerns: omitted variables, reverse causality, and
measurement error. Omitted variables will bias coefficients if a third factor affects both a
county’s schooling level and its attractiveness as a location for oil and gas wells. County
fixed effects sweep out time-invariant features of the county. State-by-year fixed effects
control for omitted variables that change over time within a state and across the U.S.
Three omitted variables may affect schooling and correlate with de-trended local drilling
activities. First, there may be local demand shocks that both affect schooling decisions
and alter the demand for drilling outputs - oil and gas. My focus on oil and gas industries
mitigates this concern as most demand for energy comes from national or foreign rather
than local consumers. Second, states or counties can influence whether or not large scale
extraction occurs in their area. Due to the potential local externalities related to
unconventional energy extraction, such as air, water, and noise pollution, amongst other
things, the states of New York and Vermont have placed moratoria on the practice. In the

104

November 2014 elections, there were eight ballot measures banning the practice in Ohio,
Texas, and California 33 (Kraus, 2014). Unobserved time-variant county characteristics,
such as social attitudes, could potentially affect local teenagers’ schooling decisions.
Third and similarly, oil and gas companies may target oil and gas formations in counties
based on characteristics not observed by researchers and that affect the outcome of
interest.
One observed characteristic, the schooling level, draws concerns of reverse causality.
The local education distribution determines the relative wages of different skill groups,
and relative wages may affect drilling location decisions. An oil or gas company may
wish to drill in a low-skill location or in a location where skills are declining over time. If
well drilling lowers education, and low schooling levels also attract drilling, the point
�1 will be biased in an ambiguous direction. In my panel setting, bias occurs if
estimation 𝛽𝛽

deviations in de-trended high school enrollment or graduation affect (i.e. after accounting
for county and year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends) affect past, present or
future drilling location decisions.
To deal with omitted variable bias and reverse causality, I require an instrument for
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 in equation (2). I rely on the geographic variation of shale

formations and calculate the percentage of area of a county that is over a shale formation.
I further multiply it with the world energy price index to obtain the instrument in my
panel. Two conditions are required for the instrumental variable strategy to be valid.
First, shale play beneath counties and world energy price must have a significant effect

33

Four of these eight were passed, including in Denton, Texas; San Benito County, California; Mendocino
County, California; and Athens, Ohio.
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on drilling activities. Second, the instrument should be exogenous to the error term in
equation (2). That is, the instrument variable can only affect deviations in schooling –
those not accounted for by the county fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-specific time
trends and additional controls – through oil and gas drilling.
The first condition holds both intuitively and statistically. The recent energy boom is
driven by shale gas extraction. The shale formation, combined with world energy price
index, correlates strongly with 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 . The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for

the first stage in the IV modeling is well above a rule of thumb of 10 for one endogenous

regressor and one instrument suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), as well as the 16.38
level suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). I further argue the second exclusion
restriction is plausibly satisfied. First, the shale formation as an initial geological
endowment is outside of human control. Further, since shale formations are subsurface
geologic formations, it is unlikely to have an impact on local economic conditions, let
alone teenagers’ schooling decisions, except through oil and gas extraction. Second, the
world energy price index, the other component of my instrument, is typically driven by
external demand or supply shocks, instead of changes in local labor or schooling
distributions. With state-by-year fixed effects control for the general shocks and trends,
the world energy price index is plausibly exogenous to local time-varying unobservables.
Similar strategies have been successfully implemented by Weber (2012), Papyrakis and
Raveh (2014) and Maniloff and Mastromonaco (2015) in the energy resource
development context.
The third econometric concern is measurement error in the schooling measures 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 .

The CCD enrollment data does not distinguish migrant students. In areas with a tight
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local labor market, the energy boom is more likely to attract immigrants filling in the
labor demand. Households might move into a booming area with teenage children who
transfer into local schools. In this case, the enrollment or diploma counts would overmeasure the local schooling in booming areas. In addition, marginal teenagers in other
areas could drop out and migrate into a booming area for work. Consequently, the point
estimation on the drilling-schooling relation could be biased upwards and the results
underestimate the true schooling decline. Thus, if a bias related to measurement error
existed, it would strengthen the results rather than weaken them.
Finally, I cluster all standard errors at the county level to prevent misleading inference
due to serial correlation in the error term across years within a county (Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan 2004). A large number of groups (1170 counties) mitigates concerns
regarding spurious correlation.
4.5. Basic Results and Discussion
4.5.1. Does the Energy Boom Affect the Local Labor Market or School
Resources?
First, I investigate the effects of drilling activities on the local labor market and school
with the instrumental variable strategy. While my data set does not allow me to identify
the skill-specific labor demand, analysis using a total number of jobs and average
earnings per job by the county as outcome variables shows significant positive effects
from drilling density (column (1) and (2) in Table 3-2). This suggests the labor market
channel is important in the energy boom and schooling relation.
I regress drilling activities on various school resources measures at the county level in
my sample. Results show that a higher drilling density is related to the higher share of
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school revenue from local, but shows no significant effects on per student total school
revenue from all local, state and federal sources, as well as per student expenditure
(column (3) to (5) in Table 3-2). On average, no increase in school resources is found in
my sample. Thus, the school resource is less likely to be the mechanism to explain the
energy boom and schooling relation. In summary, I hypothesize that schooling
persistence decreases during energy boom in booming regions.
4.5.2. The Effect of the Energy Boom on Schooling
Table 3-3 presents the results from running the regression specification in equation (2).
The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of grade 11 and 12 enrollment count.
Column 1 compares drilling counties to zero-drilling counties in a given year with the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. In column 2, I replace the categorical measure of
drilling activities with the Drilling Density measurement with the OLS estimator. Column
3 contains the panel fixed effect (FE) results, which include county and state-by-year
fixed effects. Column 4 contains the instrumental variable (IV) results, in which I
instrument the Drilling Density measure with the product of the proportion of county
covering a shale play and the world energy price index. Finally, observed control
variables are added onto the IV specification, and the results are shown in column 5. In
both IV results, the first stage Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are well above the threshold
value at 10, rejecting the weak instrument null hypothesis.
Various estimators consistently show evidence of a negative energy boom and
schooling relation. Both pooled OLS and FE estimates will be biased if drilling density is
correlated with unobserved determinants of high school enrollment. General economic
shocks, such as the 2008 great recession, could depress both high school enrollment and
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drilling activities at the same time. Fixed county characteristics related to geography,
such as hilly areas, might also affect schooling and drilling activities in the same
direction. Omitting these year and county fixed effects will bias the estimates upwards,
leading to overestimation in pooled OLS results. Once the county, year fixed effects, and
state-specific linear time trend are included in FE specifications, the coefficients of
drilling density become much smaller and not statistically different from zero. Timevarying unobservables could bias FE estimates. As discussed in detail in section 4.5.2, I
apply an instrumental variable strategy to address the omitted variable bias and potential
reverse causality concern.
The IV estimations show evidence that drilling density decreases grade 11 and 12
enrollment. The magnitude of the coefficient implies substantial educational impacts. On
average, with one additional oil/gas well drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, grade 11 and
12 enrollment would decrease 0.24% at the county level, all else equal. As a concrete
example, the 90th percentile of the distribution of annual drilling densities corresponds to
10.43 oil/gas wells drilled per 1,000 initial laborers. Based on the IV point estimations in
column 5 table 3, such a shock results in a 2.5% decrease in grade 11 and 12 enrollment
on average. Alternatively, for every four oil/gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers,
one student out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in high school on
average.
4.5.3. A Placebo Test and Robustness
Evidence has shown the negative effect of a local energy boom on grade 11 and 12
enrollment on average. In the United States, the ending age of compulsory school
attendance law varies from 16 to 18 across states. Given that the compulsory school
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regulation is implemented strictly, I should not expect that the energy boom has a
significant effect on younger teens in any grade lower than grade 11. I take advantage of
the compulsory school regulation and conduct a placebo test of the boom-schooling
relation on grade 8 to 10 enrollments.
Table 3-4 shows results of the placebo test among different grades. The energy boom,
indicated with the drilling density measure, shows no significant effect on grade 8 to 10
enrollments (column (1) to (3) in Table 3-4). The main response groups are grades 11 and
12, when the youths are mostly between 16 and 18 years old and could legally leave
school in certain states. The placebo test further validates the identification strategy.
In addition, alternative schooling and drilling measures are employed to check the
robustness of the main finding. The grade 9 to 12 enrollment rate, calculated by dividing
the grade 9 to 12 enrollment counts with the county population of age 15 to 19, is
employed as an alternative schooling measure. An alternative drilling density measure
observes the number of new oil/gas well drilled per square mile. To address concerns
with some extreme outliers in the drilling data, I further follow Maniloff and
Mastromonaco (2014) and Cascio and Narayan (2015) in also taking the inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS) of the drilling density measures. The IHS effectively allows me to
take the natural logarithm of the drilling measures but retain observations with zero wells
drilled in the estimation sample 34. In summary, there is a negative impact of drilling
activities on the grade 9 to 12 enrollment rate (Appendix Table A 3-2).

The inverse hyperbolic sine of x is sinh−1 𝑥𝑥 = ln(𝑥𝑥 + √𝑥𝑥 2 + 1). It is a convenient choice for a nonlinear
specification because it is defined at zero and for a large portion of the real line, its derivative is equivalent
to the derivative of the natural logarithm. Accordingly, I can interpret coefficient estimates as elasticities
when the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an outcome variable. (Maniloff and Mastromonaco
2015)

34
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Further, studies have adopted the Difference-in-Difference (DID) model to investigate
local impacts of the recent energy boom (Weber 2012 and 2013, Manifloff and
Mastromonaco 2014, Cascio and Narayan 2015). However, given the panel nature of my
enrollment and drilling density data, a clear experimental design can rarely be
constructed without ad hoc cut-offs on treatments. For example, one could use a specific
year to indicate the start of the boom despite the considerable variation in the timing of
the boom across areas. Therefore, I employed the panel model in the basic analysis.
Nonetheless, I further check the robustness of the results with a boom spell analysis. The
results confirm the negative boom-schooling relation (Appendix A 3.3).
4.6. Heterogeneous Effects
In the previous sections, I argued that a local energy boom could alter the opportunity
cost of schooling; and that I identified the effect on schooling by comparing grade 11 and
12 enrollments within and across counties experiencing diverse drilling densities. In this
section, I further explore the heterogeneous effects with respect to the compulsory school
regulations, taxation, county types and intensities of the energy boom.
4.6.1. Heterogeneous Effects by Compulsory Schooling Regulations
Across states in the U.S., the ending age of compulsory school attendance law varies
from 16 to 18. Table 5 summaries age ranges for compulsory schooling in 15 sample
states in the year 2000 and 2010. In 2000, 7 out of 15 sample states set the ending age at
16. By 2010, 4 states have lifted the ending age of compulsory schooling to 17 or 18
years old. If compulsory schooling laws constrained schooling choices, I would expect
the negative effect of drilling activities on schooling to be larger in states with lower age
requirements, e.g. the ending age at 16 years old.
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Utilizing variations in compulsory schooling regulations in my sample, I interact the
drilling density measure with compulsory schooling age dummies in the IV specification
to investigate heterogeneous effects. The result is shown in column (1) Table 3-6. In
states where a 16-years-old compulsory schooling age is enforced, one more oil/gas well
drilled per initial 1,000 labors decreases grade 11 and 12 enrollment by 0.60%. That is,
for every two oil/gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, one student out of a hundred
that could have enrolled would not enroll in high school on average. While in states with
a 17- or 18-years-old age regulation, the negative effect significantly drops to 0.19%,
which is less than one-third of 0.60%. In other words, when experiencing the same level
of drilling activities locally, 16 to 18 years old teenagers facing a 16-years-old
compulsory schooling law are three times more likely to not enroll in school, than those
constrained by a 17- or 18-years-old age regulation. Literature has well documented that
longer years of schooling increase individual’s lifetime earnings (e.g. Angrist and
Krueger 1991, Acemoglu and Angrist 2001), as well as promote economic development
(e.g. Lucas 1988, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). The findings call for a rise in ending
ages of the compulsory schooling law to mediate the negative schooling effect in energy
booming areas.
4.6.2. Heterogeneous Effects by Taxations on Oil and Gas Production
The basic results discussed in section 4.5 suggest the local labor market channel
dominates the negative energy boom and schooling relation. In this subsection, I ask
whether state and local taxation on oil and gas productions could meditate the negative
effect. The school resource channel supports a yes answer. A favorable school financial
status allows schools to purchase better equipment and pay higher salaries, which
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promote student retention. According to the U.S. Department of Education, federal, state,
and local sources of public school revenue account for 8%, 46%, and 46% of total
revenues respectively in 2012-2013 school year, and 81% of local revenues for public
and elementary secondary school districts were derived from local property taxes (Digest
of Education Statistics 2016).
Revenue windfalls from an energy boom could channel into school revenues through
state taxation on oil and gas production and local sources, e.g. property taxes on oil and
gas wells. Names of the resource taxes and the workings vary considerably across states
in the U.S. Utilizing the state average effective tax rates on oil and gas production
estimated by Weber, Wang and Chomas (2016), I am able to investigate the
heterogeneous effect driven by state tax variations. The effective tax rate estimations
exclude property taxes since they are set and collected by local governments rather than
state government. I further identify states that allow local government to levy property
taxes on oil and gas wells in my sample. Table 3-7 summarizes this information. Sorted
by the average effective tax rates from lowest to highest in 15 sample states, the
comparison suggests the substitution between the tax rates and local property tax policy –
for states tax oil and gas production less at the state level, property taxes are usually
levied on oil and gas wells from local governments.
I hypothesize that state or local taxation on oil and gas productions could mediate the
negative boom and schooling effect. I test them by interacting the drilling density with
the state average effective tax rates on oil and gas production from Weber, Wang and
Chomas (2016), and local property tax dummies respectively. Column (2) and (3) in
Table 3-6 show the results. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction
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term suggests that higher state taxes on oil and gas production mediates the negative
boom and schooling relation (column (2) Table 3-6). No evidence suggests the local
property tax policy makes the difference (column (3) Table 3-6).
4.6.3. Heterogeneous Effects by County Type
The similar density of drilling activities could be perceived differently across counties.
The boom-schooling relation can vary with county characteristics. I explore the
heterogeneous effects of county types in three aspects: mining counties, metro-nonmetrorural distinction, and persistent poverty counties.
The significance of the mining industry in a local economy could alter youth’s
perception about the energy boom. In a mining town, the earnings and employment
related to the energy sector are sizable and stable. Local residents are generally familiar
with the industry and likely to hold a general acceptance towards it. When an energy
boom takes place with increasing labor demand and wages, teenagers are more likely to
see the boom as an opportunity for a long-term job option, thus are more likely to choose
to work. Therefore, I would expect a larger negative effect on schooling in traditional
mining towns. I test this hypothesis by introducing an interaction term, DrillingDensity×
MineCounty, into the basic model in equation (2). MineCounty is a dummy variable and
identifies a mining county if the mining industry accounts for an annual average of 15
percent or more of total county earnings during 1998-2000, according to the USDA ERS
County Typology 2004 edition. 92 counties are identified as mining counties in my
sample. The results are shown in columns (4) in Table 3-6. As expected, on average, one
additional oil or gas well drilling per initial 1,000 laborers is associated with a significant
0.48% decline in grade 11 and 12 enrollment in mining counties, compared to a
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significant 0.20% decline in all other counties. The negative boom-schooling relation is
doubled in mining counties.
The metro-nonmetro-rural distinction could alter the boom-schooling relation in two
ways. On the one hand, a sparsely populated non-metro area implies a tight local labor
market. Compared with the sufficient labor supply in the metro area, wages are more
likely to be forced up in less populated non-metro areas with an energy boom. Therefore,
the opportunity cost of staying in school could be higher for teens in non-metro or rural
areas. On the other hand, along with the mining county argument earlier, with a generally
more diverse industry mix in a metro area, a similar size energy boom will be more
visible in non-metro and rural areas and thus more likely to be perceived by local teens.
As a result, teenagers are more likely to response to an energy boom by working and not
enrolling in school.
To test this hypothesis, I employ the USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes in 1993
and divide my sample counties into 3 exclusive groups: metro counties where a county is
in or adjacent to a metro area with more than 250,000 population; nonmetro counties
where counties have more than 2,500 urban population and are not metro counties; and
completely rural counties with less than 2,500 urban population. In my sample counties,
there are 298 metro counties, 578 non-metro counties, and 293 completely rural counties.
Leaving out metro counties as the comparison group, NonmetroCounty and RuralCounty
dummies are introduced as interactions with DrillingDensity respectively. The results are
shown in columns (5) in table 6. The significant and negative estimates on two
interactions confirm the hypothesis that grade 11 and 12 enrollment are more likely to be
negatively affected by the drilling activities in non-metro and rural areas. Evidence
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suggests that the largest effect takes place in non-metro counties: with one additional oil
or gas well drilling per initial 1,000 laborers, on average the grade 11 and 12 enrollment
significantly declines 1.38% in non-metro counties and decreases 0.98% in completely
rural counties.
Finally, the energy boom may hit persistent poverty counties differently. The boom
boosts income, which could loosen the budget constraint for households in poverty and
therefore encourage education investment. However, the emerging job opportunities and
raised wages could be more attractive in persistent poverty counties. The overall effect is
thus ambiguous. With similar methodology, I introduce an interaction term, Drilling
Density×PovertyCounty, into the basic model. PovertyCounty is a dummy variable to
identify 172 persistent poverty counties in the sample, where 20 percent or more of
county residents were poor, measured by the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses.
Shown in column (6) in Table 3-6, the results suggest a significant 0.32% larger negative
effect on grade 11 and 12 enrollment in persistent poverty counties than others counties.
4.6.4. The Heterogeneous Effect of Drilling Density
The panel model in the basic analysis yields the average marginal effects of drilling
density on high school enrollment across the sample. Given the considerable variation in
drilling across sample counties, the effects on high school enrollment could vary
depending on how intense the drilling is in a county. This implies a nonlinear boomschooling relation and a threshold effect: no effect may take place until drilling intensity
reaches a certain level. For example, when investigating the employment effect of shale
gas development in extraction counties in Pennsylvania, Wrenn, Kelsey and Jaenicke
(2015) found that only high well activity (90 or more wells) impact employment
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significantly. Given a threshold of drilling activities to boost local employment, I would
expect even higher drilling activities to alter teenager’s behavior.
To explore this effect, I follow Wrenn, Kelsey and Jaenicke (2015) and group annual
drilling density in various ways. Then I replace the continuous drilling density measure
with different group dummies to detect the threshold effect. The results are shown in
Table 3-8. In column (1), I specify a binary variable that is 1 for counties have any
drilling activity in a given year and zero otherwise. In column (2), I assign levels of
drilling activities to three discrete bins: drilling density is between 1 to 10 oil or gas wells
drilled per initial 1,000 laborers in a given year (Drill 1-10), then between 10 to 100 oil or
gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers in a given year (Drill 10 -100), and more than
100 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers in a given year (Drill 100 +). In
column (3), I further divide the Drill 100 + group into Drill 100 -200 (100 ≤ drill density
< 200) and Drill 200 + (drill density ≥ 200). The coefficients represent percent changes
for the effects relative to the baseline enrollment trend in counties when no drilling
activity took place. When the drilling density is less than 100 wells per initial 1,000
laborers, the impact of drilling activities on grade 11 and 12 enrollment is not significant.
Evidence show significant negative relations when the drilling density is more than 100,
implying a threshold effect. The threshold effects or the nonlinear relation can be
explored further with nonparametric models in further research.
4.7. Conclusions
Energy booms can discourage investments in education by increasing the opportunity
cost for students to stay in school, especially for students who highly discount the future.
This paper finds that for the 15 oil and gas production states in the U.S. during the period
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2000 to 2013, the intensive drilling activities altered enrollment decisions of teenagers.
The magnitudes I find suggest that for every four oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000
laborers, one student out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in grade
11 and 12 on average. More specifically, given that the drilling density is 7.58, and that
total count of grade 11 and 12 enrolled students is 1,962 in an average county during a
year, about 36 fewer students per county (0.24% × 7.58 × 1,962) and overall 41,760
fewer students across the 15 states enrolled in grade 11 and 12 with the energy boom.
While recent oil and gas development across the U.S. benefits the economy with jobs
and may set the U.S. on a path toward energy independence, this study points to another
potential negative side effect on schooling besides environmental concerns. The decision
of not enrolling in school but rather working could well be a rational one in the face of
relatively high wages. Those students who drop out may re-enroll later in their lives
(Emery, Ferrer and Green 2012) thus mediating the overall effect on human capital
accumulation. Nonetheless, teenagers who overweight the present could give up
education earlier than they should have.
Given the trade-off in recent oil and gas development, it is beneficial to recognize and
identify the heterogeneous effects of the benefits and costs related to the energy boom.
This study shows that the negative boom-schooling relation is larger in states with a 16years-old compulsory schooling age regulation, lower state effective tax rate on oil and
gas productions, traditional mining, non-metro, and persistent poverty counties. Also,
drilling activities may not significantly impact local schooling until they reach a certain
intensity. Future research can focus on the heterogeneity across regions to better facilitate
local policy making.
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Along the lines of Atkin (2016), some policy remedies can mitigate the negative
schooling impact of the energy boom by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling while
welcoming the local economic boom at the same time. For example, an increase in the
ending age of compulsory attendance in some states, payments to households conditioned
on children’s school attendance, and finally, opportunities and reduced costs of returning
to school or other further education that allows dropouts to obtain the foregone education
in times of energy bust.

119

4.8. Tables in Chapter 4
Table 4-1 Summary Statistics

Outcome Variables
Grade 11 and 12 Enrollment Counts
Grade 8 Enrollment Counts
Grade 9 Enrollment Counts
Grade 10 Enrollment Counts
Grade 11 Enrollment Counts
Grade 12 Enrollment Counts
Key Explanatory Variable
Newly Drilled Oil and Gas Well Counts
(#)
Well Spud per 1,000 labors in 2000
Well Spud per Square Mile
Share of County Area Covered by a
Shale Play [0,1]
Controls – Schooling Conditions
Pupil-Teacher Ratio
Total School Revenue per Students
($1,000/student)
Total School Expenditure per Students
($1,000/student)
Share of School Revenue from Local
[0,1]
Controls – Economic Conditions
Median Household Income ($10,000)
Income per Capita ($10,000)
Poverty Rate [0,1]
Youth Poverty Rate [0,1]
Total Count Number of Jobs (#)
Unemployment rate [0,1]
Earn per Job ($10,000)
Controls – Demographics
Population per Square Mile (1,000
persons /sq. mi.)
Population between Age 15 and 19 (#)
Share of African American [0,1]
Share of Hispanic [0,1]
Share of population above age 65 [0,1]

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

16,179
16,256
16,190
16,185
16,183
16,181

1,962.08
1,109.31
1,241.33
1,119.16
1,010.95
951.53

5,201.08
3,123.08
3,708.60
3,172.83
2,708.02
2,496.53

3
1
1
1
1
1

101,966
71,481
101,687
85,923
53,115
48,851

16,380
16,380
16,380

30.55
7.58
0.03

96.41
63.58
0.08

0
0
0

2708
3857.14
1.21

1,170

0.34

0.43

0

1.00

16,167

0.14

0.03

0.01

2.03

15,108

11.78

6.70

0.56

172.92

15,108

11.71

6.70

0.28

148.50

15,129

0.39

0.17

0.07

1.00

16,380
16,378
16,380
16,380

3.93
2.99
0.16
0.23

1.03
0.97
0.06
0.09

0
1.02
0
0

16,378
16,380
16,378

504.19
0.06
3.42

1,651.68
0.03
0.99

0.60
0
0.70

10.52
18.96
0.53
0.70
29,612.0
8
0.24
11.94

16,380

0.18

1.28

0

71.49

6,332.76
0.06
0.10
0.15

17,099.0
4
0.10
0.16
0.04

1
0
0
0.03

301,079
0.69
0.98
0.37

16,377
16,377
16,377
16,377
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Table 4-2 (continued)
The number of Violent Crimes per
Person
15,454
0.002
0.002
0
0.031
The number of Property Crimes per
Person
15,464
0.016
0.014
0
0.241
Notes: units are in ( ) and ranges are in [ ]; outcome variable and schooling condition
control variable data are obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES); oil and gas well records are requested from state agencies such as Department of
Natural Resource, Department of Environment Protect/Commission, Industrial
Commission, and Geological Survey. Other data of control variables are from the Census
Bureau’s U.S. Counties database.
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Table 4-3 The Effects of Drilling Activities on Local Labor Market and School
Resources

Drilling
Density

(3)

Total
School
Revenue
per Student
(log)
(4)

Total
School
Expenditure
per Student
(log)
(5)

0.0006*
(0.0003)

-0.0001
(0.0007)

-0.0013
(0.0009)

Total
Number of
Jobs (log)

Earn per
Job (log)

Share of
School
Revenue
from Local

(1)

(2)

0.0011***
(0.0004)

0.0016***
(0.0005)

Dependent
Variable
504
34,200
0.39
11,780
11,710
Means (in
levels)
Observations
14193
14193
14393
14372
14372
2
R
0.418
0.766
0.127
0.661
0.550
KleibergenPaap F-stat
31.591
31.591
36.811
37.221
37.221
(1st Stage)
County FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-by-year
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
FE
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: the point estimates of coefficients on Drilling Density - the number of new oil and
gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 2000 – are summarized. All models instrument
Drilling Density measures with the product of the proportion of county covering a shale
play and the world energy price index. Controls in column (1) and (2) include three sets
of control variables: schooling conditions (e.g. pupil-teacher ratio, log of total revenue
per student, log of total expenditure per student, percentage school revenue from local),
economic conditions (e.g. log of median household income, log of income per capita,
poverty rate), and demographic (e.g. population density, African-American population
share, Hispanic population share, senior population share, and crime rate). Controls in
column (3) to (6) include two sets of control variables: economic conditions and
demographics. County clustered standard errors in parentheses. − * significant at 10
percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 4-4 The Effect of Drilling Activities on High School Grade 11 and 12 Enrollment,
2000-2013
(1)
OLS
AnyDrill

DrillingDensity

Grade 11 to 12 Enrollment Count (log)
(2)
(3)
(4)
OLS
FE
IV

(5)
IV

-0.1507***
(0.0225)
0.0079***
(0.0015)

-0.0001
(0.0001)

-0.0026*** -0.0024***
(0.0007)

(0.0009)

Observations
16179
16179
16179
16179
14103
2
R
0.003
0.036
0.164
0.102
0.127
Kleibergen-Paap F43.692
34.628
stat (1st Stage)
County FE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-by-year FE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controls
No
No
No
No
Yes
Notes: The mean enrollment of grade 11 to 12 in level is 1,962 students per county;
AnyDrill =1 if counties have any oil or gas well drilled in a given year; Drilling Density
is the number of new oil and gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 2000. The IV
columns instrument Drilling Density measures with the product of the proportion of
county covering a shale play and the world energy price index. Controls includes three
sets of control variables: school conditions (e.g. pupil-teacher ratio, log of total revenue
per student, log of total expenditure per student, percentage school revenue from local),
economic conditions (e.g. log of median household income, log of income per capita,
poverty rate, log of job numbers, unemployment rate, log of earn per job), and
demographic (e.g. population density, black population share, Hispanic population share,
senior population share, and crime rate). County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
−* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1
percent level.
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Table 4-5 The Placebo Test among Grade 8 to 12
Dependent
Variables:
Enrollment
Counts (log)
Drilling
Density

Grade 8
(1)

Grade 9
(2)

Grade 10
(3)

Grade 11
(4)

Grade 12
(5)

0.0013

0.0002

-0.0005

-0.0025***

-0.0023**

(0.0008)

(0.0008)

(0.0008)

(0.0009)

(0.0010)

Dependent
Variable
1,109
1,241
1,119
1,011
952
Means
(in level)
Observations
14,140
14,105
14,106
14,105
14,103
2
R
0.154
0.195
0.166
0.089
0.084
KleibergenPaap F-stat
35.665
34.472
34.611
34.629
34.630
(1st Stage)
County FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-byYes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
year FE
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: the point estimates of coefficients on Drilling Density - the number of new oil and
gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 2000 – are summarized in two panels. All
models instrument Drilling Density measures by the product of the proportion of county
covering a shale play and the world energy price index. County fixed effects, state-byyear fixed effects, and controls are included in all models. County clustered standard
errors in parentheses.−*significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level,
*** significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 4-6 Age Ranges for Compulsory School in 15 Sample States, 2000 and 2010
2000

2010

Policy Changing
Year

Arkansas 1

5 to 17

5 to 17

---

Colorado

---

6 to 17

2007

Kentucky

6 to 16

6 to 16

---

Louisiana 1

7 to 17

7 to 18

2006

Michigan

6 to 16

6 to 18

2010

Montana 1

7 to 16

7 to 16

---

New York 1,2

6 to 16

6 to 16

---

North Dakota

7 to 16

7 to 16

---

Ohio

6 to 18

6 to 18

---

Oklahoma

5 to 18

5 to 18

---

Pennsylvania 1

8 to 17

8 to 17

---

Texas

6 to 18

6 to 18

---

Utah

6 to 18

6 to 18

---

West Virginia

6 to 16

6 to 17

2010

Wyoming 1

6 to 16

7 to 16

---

1

Notes: - Child may be exempted from compulsory attendance if he/she meets state
requirements for early withdrawal with or without meeting conditions for a diploma or
equivalency.
2
-New York City and Buffalo require school attendance until age 17 unless employed.
Source: Council of Chief State School Officers, Key State Education Policies on PK–12
Education, 2000; Education Commission of the States (ECS), ECS StateNotes,
Compulsory School Age Requirements, retrieved August 9, 2010, from
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/86/62/8662.pdf.
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Table 4-7 Heterogeneous Effects among Counties

DrillingDensity
DrillingDensity ×
CompulsoryAge16
DrillingDensity ×
CompulsoryAge17

(1)
-0.0019**
(0.0010)
-0.0041*

Grade 11 – 12 Enrollment Count (log)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.0121*** -0.0031 -0.0020**
0.0091
(0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0009)
(0.0056)

(6)
-0.0019**
(0.0008)

(0.0024)
0.0028
(0.0038)

DrillingDensity ×
AveEffectiveTaxRates

0.0023***
(0.0005)

DrillingDensity ×
LocalPropertyTax
DrillingDensity ×
MineCounty

0.0008
(0.0020)
-0.0028***
(0.0010)
-0.0138***
(0.0052)
-0.0098*
(0.0054)

DrillingDensity ×
NonMetroCounty
DrillingDensity ×
RuralCounty

DrillingDensity ×
-0.0032**
PovertyCounty
(0.0015)
Observations
13853
13426
14103
14103
14103
14103
R2
0.122
0.035
0.145
0.106
0.087
0.163
Kleibergen-Paap F12.814
15.512
10.483
16.356
14.309
14.620
stat (1st Stage)
Notes: Drilling Density is the number of new oil and gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in
2000. Interactions of Drilling Density and different state/county typologies are introduced into
the basic model. Data of average effective tax rates by state are from Weber et al. (2016) Table
A4. CompulsoryAge16=1 if the ending compulsory school age is 16 in a given year; similarly
applies to CompulsoryAge17. LocalPropertyTax=1 if states allow local government to levy advalorem property taxes on oil and gas property. Based on USDA ERS County Typology 2004
edition, MiningCounty=1 if the mining industry is accounting for an annual average of 15 percent
or more of total county earnings during 1998-2000. PovertyCounty=1 for persistent poverty
counties, where 20 percent or more of county residents were poor, measured by the 1970, 1980,
1990 and 2000 censuses. Based on USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes in 2003,
NonmetroCounty=1 if counties with more than 2,500 urban population and not in or adjacent to
metro areas; RuralCounty=1 if counties with less than 2,500 urban population. All models
instrument Drilling Density measures with the product of the proportion of county covering a
shale play and the world energy price index. County and state by year fixed effects are included.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant
at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level.

126

Table 4-8 Taxation on Energy Windfalls

State

Average Effective Tax
Rates on Oil and Gas
Production
(%, state tax only,
2004-2013)1

Whether Levy
Local Property
Taxes on Wells2

Share of School
Revenue from
Local (%, average
across counties,
2000-2013)3

Ohio

0.3

Yes

42.8

Arkansas

0.9

Yes

29.1

Pennsylvania

1.2

No

52.0

Colorado

1.7

Yes

50.5

Utah

2.0

Yes

33.4

Texas

4.1

Yes

48.1

West Virginia

4.2

Yes

27.2

Wyoming

4.4

Yes

43.4

Kentucky

4.7

Yes

22.9

Michigan

4.8

No

36.3

Louisiana

5.3

No

34.1

Oklahoma

6.2

No

31.2

North Dakota

8.1

No

48.9

Montana

8.6

No

39.8

New York
---No
41.0
1
Note: -Data cited from Weber, Wang, and Chomas (2016) table A4.
2
- Information from Independent Fiscal Office (IFO) of Pennsylvania (2014) and Newell
and Raimi (2015)
3
- Data downloaded from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
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Table 4-9 Threshold Effects of Drilling Density
Drilling Density
Dummies
AnyDrill

Grade 11 – 12 Enrollment Count (log)
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.0023
(0.0054)

Drill 1-10

-0.0021
(0.0054)
-0.0074
(0.0095)
-0.0925**
(0.0433)

Drill 10-100
Drill 100+

-0.0021
(0.0054)
-0.0073
(0.0095)

-0.0981*
(0.0511)
Drill 200+
-0.0765*
(0.0448)
Observation
6680
6680
6680
2
R
0.356
0.359
0.359
County FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-by-year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note: Drilling Density is replaced with group dummies in the basic model. AnyDrill =1 if
counties have any oil or gas well drilled in a given year; Drill 1-10 =1 if counties have
more than zero but less than 10 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given
year; Drill 10 -100 =1 if counties have more than 10 but less than 100 oil or gas wells
drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given year; Drill 100 + =1 if counties have more than
100 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given year; Drill 100 -200 =1 if
counties have more than 100 but less than 200 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000
labor in a given year; Drill 200 + =1 if counties have more than 200 oil or gas wells
drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given year. Fixed effect estimators are applied. County
clustered standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant
at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level.
Drill 100-200
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4.9. Figures in Chapter 4

Figure 4-1 Time Trend of the Oil/Gas Well Drilling in 15 States in the U.S., 1900-2014
Note: Author's calculations based on well records data from various state agencies
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Figure 4-2 Fifteen States in the Sample and Proportion of Each County Contained above
a Shale Play
Note: Author's calculations based on the U.S. shale play shapefile from EIA.
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Figure 4-3 Average County Drilling Activities and Grade 11 to 12 Enrollment, 20002013
Note: Author's calculations based on well records data from various state agencies and
schooling data from National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
.

131

Panel A: 2000

Panel B: 2013

Figure 4-4 Drilling Densities across Sample Counties, 2000 vs. 2013
Note: Author's calculations based on well records data from various state agencies.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The dissertation research comprises three essays on the topic of the resource curse
hypothesis and its mechanisms. The phenomenon of low economic growth in resourcerich regions is recognized as the “resource curse”. These essays will contribute to an
understanding of the regional resource-growth relation within a nation.
The resource curse hypothesis was tested within the highly developed United States. A
system of equations model allows me to decompose the resource effect and account for
the two mechanisms, crowding-out effects and institution effects, simultaneously in one
setting. The results suggest that both effects contribute to the resource-growth relation,
but also that the overall resource effect is positive or neutral. The decomposition with the
direct, crowding-out, and institution effects at a subnational level offers a better
understanding of resource curse mechanisms. First, I found that the direct resource effect
was positive or neutral once the crowding-out and institutional effects were isolated.
Then, the evidence suggests that resource wealth crowds out industrial investment, thus
hindering growth in the U.S. This result parallels the local Dutch Disease narrative that
wealth generated by the sale of natural resources tends to crowd out the manufacturing
sector. Finally, I focus on state and local government efficiency as a proxy for
institutional outcomes and further employ ex-ante measures to minimize endogeneity
concerns. The results confirm that institutions mediate the crowding-out effect and reject
the resource curse hypothesis within the U.S. in the past two decades.
The comparison between the two largest energy-producing nations in the world shed
light on the resource – growth relation in distinct economic systems and institution
arrangements. Using panel data from 1990 to 2015, I compared the effects of resource
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revenues on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces
and American states. To address the endogeneity issue of resource revenues with regional
economic conditions, I employ the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy and instrument the
resource revenue with a product of the resource reserves in 1990 and the national primary
energy prices. Evidence suggests that resource revenues increase the regional growth in
both China and the U.S. with a larger and more statistically significant effect shown
across U.S. states. The booming resources, coal in China, oil and natural gas in the U.S.,
contribute to the positive resource – growth relation in the short term. However, resource
revenues show negative effects on growth-related factors, such as education attainments
and R&D activities while pushing up the investment across regions. This cast concerns
on the long-term economic growth in resource-rich regions.
Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price
reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market
price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the
positive resource effect in China. The Western Development Strategy also show a
positive effect on strength the resource – growth relation in western provinces. On the
other hand, with all natural resources owned by the state and majority managed by the
state-owned enterprises, the fiscal reform does not seem to matter in the resource –
growth relation in the China case with the results.
Investigating the human resource channel in particular, evidence suggests that the
intensive drilling activities altered enrollment decisions of teenagers for the 15 oil and
gas production states in the U.S. during the period 2000 to 2013. The magnitudes I find
suggest that for every four oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, one student
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out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in grade 11 and 12 on average.
More specifically, given that the drilling density is 7.58, and that total count of grade 11
and 12 enrolled students is 1,962 in an average county during a year, about 36 fewer
students per county and overall 41,760 fewer students across the 15 states enrolled in
grade 11 and 12 with the energy boom. that the negative boom-schooling relation is
larger in states with a 16-years-old compulsory schooling age regulation, lower state
effective tax rate on oil and gas productions, traditional mining, non-metro, and persistent
poverty counties. Policies remedies can mitigate the negative schooling impact of the
energy boom by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling while welcoming the local
economic boom at the same time. For example, an increase in the ending age of
compulsory attendance in some states.
In an overview of the resource curse literature, Frederick van der Ploeg (2011) stated
that a key question remained “why some resource-rich economies [.] are more successful
while others perform badly despite their immense natural wealth”(page 366). This
dissertation contributes pieces of evidence that resource promotes regional economy
better with more effective local governments (e.g. across the U.S. states) and more
efficient market system (e.g. the China case). Furthermore, resource developments tend
to mediate human capital accumulation, thus cast concern on the economic growth in the
long run.
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Appendices
A 1.1 the Government Efficiency Index Measure
Following Borge, Falch, and Tovmo (2008), Borge, Parmer, and Torvik (2013) and
Andrews and Brewer (2013), the efficiency is measured as the ratio between total output
and available resource. The output is a weighted Z-scores summation of five main public
service sectors (s): Education, Health, Highways, Public Safety, and Environment, which
account for about 89% of the state and local government direct general expenditures in
2010. All sectors are weighted by their expenditure share (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 ). The measure relies on a

𝑖𝑖
total 15 indicators (𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
) of production from the different service sectors (see table A1).

Indicators are equally weighted within each sector (𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ). The calculation of the aggregate
output measure is as follows:

𝐽𝐽𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖
(1) 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑5𝑠𝑠=1[𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 (∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
) ],
𝑖𝑖
where 𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
=

𝑖𝑖
𝚤𝚤
����
(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
−𝑥𝑥
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 )

𝚤𝚤
����
� 1 ∑𝑁𝑁 �𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖 −𝑥𝑥
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �
𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖=1 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

2

𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽

; ∑𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 = 1; ∑𝑗𝑗=1 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 1;

𝑖𝑖
𝚤𝚤
Here, 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
is indicator j in sector s of state and local governments at state i at time t, ����
𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
is

the sample mean for each indicator j across 50 states. p and q are, respectively, sector
and indicator weights. N is the sample size of 50 states.

To obtain the efficiency measure, I divide the output by real per capita revenue of state
and local governments (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) for each state i at time t (equation 6). State and
local government revenue data are collected from the Census of Government Finances
and Annual Survey of Local Government Finances, which sums intergovernmental
revenue, total taxes, charges and miscellaneous general revenue, utility revenue, liquor
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store revenue and insurance trust revenue. The revenues are deflated by annual Consumer
Price Index (CPI).
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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A 1.2 Indicators, weights and sources in the aggregated output measure

Sectors

Education

Sector
weights
(𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 )

0.40

𝑖𝑖 1
Indicators (𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
)
Test score on K12 (Ratio at or
above basic):
NAEP 4th reading; NAEP 4th math;
NAEP 8th reading; NAEP 8th math

Test score on college entrance:
SAT mean score; ACT mean score
Teens ages 16 to 19, not in school
and not high school graduates
High School Graduation
Infant deaths per 1,000 births

Health

Highways

Public
Safety

0.29

0.10

0.10

Environment 0.10

Source
National Center for
Education Statistics
Annual SAT Report on
College & Career Readiness,
The College Board; ACT
website
the KIDS COUNT Data
Center, the Annie E. Casey
Foundation
National Vital Statistics
System, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services

Limited activity days per 30 days:
poor physical health days; poor
mental health days
Immunization coverage-children
Infectious disease per 100,000
population: Chlamydia, Pertussis,
and Salmonella

America's Health Rankings2
Publications, United Health
Foundation

Percentage of highway bridges that
are structurally sound

Federal Highway
Administration, U.S.
Department of
Transportation

Violent crime rate per 100,000
population
Property crimes rate per 100,000
population
Parole violators among prison
admissions
Fire death rate per million
(1,000,000) population
Air Pollution: Average exposure of
the general public to particulate
matter of 2.5 microns or less in size
(PM2.5)
Count number of sites of brownfield
grant

Bureau of Justice Statistics

U.S. Fire Administration

EPA
EPA Brownfields Grant Fact
Sheet

Note: a. Some of the indicators were inverted to ensure that a higher score would reflect better performance
(e.g. Teens ages 16 to 19 not in school and not high school graduates, most of the health indicators except
Immunization coverage, and all public safety and environment indicators). b. America’s Health Rankings
is the longest running annual assessment of the U.S. health on a state-by-state basis. For detailed measures
and sources, please refer to http://www.americashealthrankings.org/about/annual.
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A 1.3 Description of variables used in the robustness checks
Variable

Definition

Year available

Source

Economic Freedom
Index

Annual Economic Freedom of North America Index, state and local
government

1981-2013

Fraser Institute

Government size

EFNA score of area 1: size of government (state and local )3

1981-2013

Fraser Institute

Government
employment

State and local government employment as a percentage of total state
employment

1995-2014

Regional Economic Accounts, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, U.S.
Department of Commerce

Governance
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Demographical and Social Characteristics
Ethnic diversity Index

=[1-∑(Race)2]*100, where Race denotes the share of population selfidentified as race (White, Black or African-American, American
Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Some Other Race
and Two or More races)4

1995-2014

U.S. Census, Current Population
Survey

Population density

People per square mile

1990-2014

U.S. Census, Current Population
Survey

The density per 10,000 persons for following establishment: legal
services(5411), Management, Scientific and Technical Consulting
Services (5416), Advertising, Public Relations, and Related Services
(5418); Social Advocacy Organizations (8133), and Business,
Professional, Labor, Political, and Similar Organizations (8139)1

1997-2013

County Business Pattern

Rent-seeking behavior
Rent Seeking Density

A 1.3 (continued)
Campaign
Contribution share
from Energy sector

The share of the contributions from energy and natural resource
sector to selected offices candidates, such as gubernatorial, state
house/assembly, state supreme court, state senate and other statewide candidates.

1994-2014

Variable

Definition

Year available

Source

Lobby Groups

The data represent the totals of interest groups registered to lobby or
that were represented by a registered lobbyist in the state for that
year or legislative session per 10,000 persons.

2006-2013

National Institute on Money in State
Politics2

Lobbyists
140

Biennale

2006-2013

National Institute on Money in State
Politics2

Alternative dependent variable
Growth of GSP per
capita

Per capita real GDP by state, percent change from preceding period

1997-2014

Regional Economic Accounts, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, U.S.
Department of Commerce

Population Growth

Population percent change from preceding period by state

1997-2014

Population Estimates Program,
Population Division, U.S. Census
Bureau

Note: a. The sector selected are based on Sobel and Garrett (2002) and the updated work by Hall and Ross (2010) table 2 “Traditional, In-Kind,
and Indirect Rent Seeking industries”(page 12).
b. http://beta.followthemoney.org
c. Part 1 of EFNA index is Size of Government, which includes 1A. General Consumption Expenditures by Government as a Percentage of
GDP; 1B. Transfers and Subsidies as a Percentage of GDP; 1C: Social Security Payments as a Percentage of GDP.
d. Calculated by authors following Alesina et al. (1999) and Rupasingha et al. (2002).

A 1.4 Added Control Approach Robustness Checks

Specification
Base

Ln(Inc) t-1
Resource_point
Resource_point×
Gov. Efficiency
Investment (u)
Human Capital(u)
R&D(u)

Governance
(GOV)

I.
Base
-10.70***
(3.91)
0.06
(0.10)
0.25**
(0.09)
0.48
(0.31)
0.03
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.07)

Corruption
Eco. Freedom Index
Gov. Efficiency
Gov. Size
Gov. Emp. Share

Demographics
(DEM)

Ethnic Diversity Index
Population Density

Rent Seeking
Behavior
(RS)

Rent Seeking Density
Campaign Contribution
from Energy Sector
Lobby Groups

II.
+GOV
-8.25*
(4.73)
0.30**
(0.14)
0.53***
(0.13)
0.41
(0.34)
0.02
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.10)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.516
(0.81)
0.18
(0.13)
-0.01
(0.26)
0.79***
(0.29)

III.
+DEM
-9.18*
(4.66)
0.29**
(0.14)
0.50***
(0.14)
0.34
(0.34)
0.03
(0.06)
0.02
(0.09)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.77)
0.33**
(0.14)
0.15
(0.26)
0.69**
(0.30)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)

IV.
+RS1
-5.64***
(1.83)
0.60***
(0.11)
0.60***
(0.15)
0.95*
(0.52)
0.09
(0.08)
-0.05
(0.21)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.86
(0.96)
0.06
(0.15)
-0.54
(0.35)
0.61*
(0.31)
-0.05
(0.03)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.241
(0.19)
0.05
(0.06)

Lobbyists
Constant

112.1***
58.78***
(41.39)
(20.30)
No. Observations
798
699
699
3621
2
Within R
0.56
0.55
0.56
0.55
Note: Fixed Effect models with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (in parentheses) are used to
estimate; u indicates the residuals from equation (2); * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; The
sample size drops dramatically due to missing values: The variable “Campaign Contribution from
Energy Sector” covers the statewide general elections, which take places biannually depending on
the states, so data on almost half of the years are missing. The National Institute on Money in
State Politics started to report the data on lobby groups and lobbyists since 2006.
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VI.
+RS2
-34.59***
(3.10)
0.28*
(0.15)
0.58***
(0.11)
-1.88***
(0.31)
-0.083
(0.20)
-0.24
(0.16)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.16
(0.51)
0.11
(0.20)
0.11
(0.44)
0.56
(0.75)
-0.20***
(0.05)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.81***
(0.26)
-0.16***
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.34)
-0.07
(0.30)
0
(0)
1741
0.74

A 1.5 Robustness Check with the Reduced Form Eq. (3)

Growth

I.
FE

II.
FD

L1.Growth

III.
SysGMM
-0.00
(0.03)

W.Growth
Ln(Inc) t-1

IV.
SAC

VI.
Dynamic
SAC
-0.03
(0.03)

0.65***
(0.10)

0.91***
(0.05)

-10.70***
(3.91)

-85.72***
(4.99)

-24.27***
(3.42)

-9.40***
(2.23)

-7.02***
(1.44)

Resource_point

0.06
(0.10)

0.20
(0.13)

0.07**
(0.03)

0.11**
(0.05)

0.08**
(0.04)

Resource_point×
Gov. Efficiency

0.25**
(0.09)

0.29*
(0.17)

0.42***
(0.08)

0.23***
(0.04)

0.19***
(0.05)

Investment (u)

0.48
(0.31)

-0.29
(0.30)

-0.53
(0.56)

0.38
(0.33)

0.37
(0.62)

Human Capital(u)

0.03
(0.06)

0.06
(0.05)

0.03
(0.03)

0.04
(0.05)

0.08
(0.07)

R&D(u)

-0.02
(0.07)

-0.08
(0.09)

-0.22***
(0.05)

-0.04
(0.10)

-0.10
(0.15)

Constant

112.1***
(41.39)

2.03***
(0.16)

256.9***
(35.88)

98.54***
(23.28)

74.01***
(15.12)

No. Observations
No. of states
adj. R2
State Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Altonji-Elder-Taber
Statistics

798
50
0.54
Yes
Yes
1.50***

746
50
0.72
Yes
Yes
1.94***

798
50

768
48
0.68
Yes
Yes

720
48
0.69
Yes
Yes

(0.34)

(0.26)

[0.00]

[0.00]

System GMM post-estimation tests
AR(1) test
AR(2) test
Sargan over-identification test
Spatial panel autocorrelation tests
LM SAC (LMErr+LMLag)

Yes
Yes

[0.00]
[0.30]
[1.00]

Note:” L1.Growth” is dependent variable with one period lag; “W.Growth” is spatial lagged dependent
variable W is the row-standardized N×N rook contiguity-based binary matrix in which each element is set
to one if two states share a common border, and zero otherwise; u indicates the residuals from equation (2);
Standard errors are in parentheses, Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are used in FE model; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;p values are reported in square brackets; only 48 continental states are included in
spatial analyses; the number of observations varies because of lagged variables.
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A 1.6 Robustness Check with Different Dependent Variables
I.
Growth_Income
0.31(0.26)

II.
Growth- GSPpc

III.
Growth_Pop.

Investment Ln(Inc)t-1
Ln(GSPpc) t-1
0.36*(0.22)
Ln(Pop) t-1
-0.17(0.32)
Resource_point
-0.03***(0.01)
-0.04***(0.01)
-0.03***(0.01)
Constant
-2.42(2.70)
-2.98(2.25)
3.35(4.80)
Human
Ln(Inc)t-1
0.46(1.13)
Capital
Ln(GSPpc) t-1
2.27**(0.93)
Ln(Pop) t-1
-3.48***(1.34)
Resource_point
0.10***(0.04)
0.07*(0.04)
0.12***(0.04)
Constant
14.80(11.57)
-3.95(9.65)
72.62***(20.51)
R&D
Ln(Inc)t-1
-1.06*(0.55)
Ln(GSPpc) t-1
-0.54(0.46)
Ln(Pop) t-1
0.84(0.66)
Resource_point
0.01(0.02)
0.01(0.02)
-0.00 (0.02)
Constant
12.58**(5.67)
7.24(4.75)
-11.24(10.10)
Growth
Ln(Inc)t-1
-10.78***(2.04)
Ln(GSPpc) t-1
-10.34***(2.19)
Ln(Pop) t-1
-5.40***(0.66)
Resource_point
0.23***(0.08)
0.12(0.11)
0.18***(0.02)
Resource_point×
0.41***(0.07)
0.38***(0.09)
0.09***(0.02)
Gov. Efficiency
Investment
3.36***(0.75)
2.55***(0.96)
1.54***(0.21)
Human Capital
0.26*(0.15)
0.51**(0.20)
0.03(0.05)
R&D
1.52**(0.67)
2.45***(0.88)
0.27 (0.20)
Constant
102.7***(21.06) 95.06***(21.67) 81.05***(10.28)
No.Observations
747
747
747
State Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note: Growth-income refers to annual growth rate in real per capita personal income, GrowthGSPpc is the annual growth rate in real Gross State Production per capita, Growth-Pop is the
annual growth rate in state population; 3SLS are applied to estimate; standard errors are in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A 3.1 Occupations and Educational Attainment in Mining Sector

Panel A Largest Occupations in Sector 21 Mining and Requirements for Entry
Occupation
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Roustabouts, Oil, and Gas
Service Unit Operators, Oil, Gas, and Mining
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers
First-Line Supervisors of Construction Trades and
Extraction Workers
Operating Engineers and Other Construction
Equipment Operators
Rotary Drill Operators, Oil, and Gas
Derrick Operators, Oil, and Gas
Helpers--Extraction Workers

Employment
60,830
55,850
41,720
34,190
30,070
23,590
18,840
18,600

Share of total
employment in
mining sector
7.88%
7.24%
5.41%
4.43%
3.90%
3.06%
2.44%
2.41%

Typical education needed for entry

Work experience in a
related occupation

Less than high school
Less than high school
Postsecondary non-degree award
High school diploma or equivalent

None
None
None
5 years or more

High school diploma or equivalent

None

Less than high school
Less than high school
High school diploma or equivalent

None
None
None

Panel B Educational attainment for workers 25 years and older by Largest Occupations in Sector 21 Mining
Occupation

Less than high school
diploma (%)
26.4
26.4
18.8

High school diploma or
equivalent (%)
45.8
45.8
48.9

Roustabouts, Oil, and Gas
Service Unit Operators, Oil, Gas, and Mining
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers
First-Line Supervisors of Construction Trades and Extraction
13.6
42.6
Workers
Operating Engineers and Other Construction Equipment Operators
21.2
53.4
Rotary Drill Operators, Oil, and Gas
26.4
45.8
Derrick Operators, Oil, and Gas
26.4
45.8
Helpers--Extraction Workers
22.4
50.9
Sources: Occupational Employment Statistics and Employment Projections program, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic

More than High School
(%)
27.8
27.8
32.4
43.9
25.5
27.8
27.8
26.6

A3.2 the Robustness Check with Alternative Measures

DrillingDensity1

IHS (DrillingDensity1)
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DrillingDensity2

(1)
(2)
FE
IV
-0.0004 -0.0614*
(0.0035) (0.0359)

(3)
FE

Grade 9 to 12 Enrollment Rate
(4)
(5)
(6)
IV
FE
IV

(7)
FE

(8)
IV

-0.1199 -1.4139*
(0.1609) (0.7980)
-0.6145 -13.2738*
(1.3105) (7.5428)

-0.6514 -13.9803*
(1.4347) (7.9353)
Observations
14100
14100
14100
14100
14100
14100
14100
14100
2
R
0.121
0.005
0.121
0.030
0.121
0.031
0.121
0.031
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st Stage)
33.992
144.379
104.960
113.914
County FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-by-year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Drilling Density 1 is the number of new oil and gas well drilled per 1,000 labors in 2000. Drilling Density 2 is the number of
new oil and gas well drilled per square mile. IHS(Drilling Density) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of drilling density measures
respectively. More specifically, the inverse hyperbolic sine of x is sinh−1 𝑥𝑥 = ln(𝑥𝑥 + √𝑥𝑥 2 + 1) .The IV columns instrument Drilling
Density measures by the product of the proportion of county covering a shale play and the world energy price index. County clustered
standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level.
IHS (DrillingDensity2)

A 3.3 Heterogeneous Effects with Drilling Boom and Decline Spells

BoomSpellcit

DeclineSpellcit

BoomSpellcit * BoomDurationi

DeclineSpellcit *DeclineDurationi

Grade 11-12 Enrollment Count (log)
(1)
(2)
(3)
**
*
-0.0738
-0.1180
(0.0295)
(0.0605)
-0.0104
0.0484
(0.0258)
(0.0775)
0.0094
(0.0075)
-0.0135
(0.0160)

Duration Dummies
BoomDuration 3 − 4 yrsi

-0.0766*
(0.0409)
-0.0752*
BoomDuration 5 − 6 yrsi
(0.0444)
-0.0388*
BoomDuration 7 − 8 yrsi
(0.0208)
0.0100
BoomDuration 10 more yrsi
(0.0347)
0.0118
DeclineDuration 3 − 4 yrsi
(0.0338)
0.0022
DeclineDuration 5 − 7 yrsi
(0.0353)
Observations
9,452
9,452
10,294
2
R
0.319
0.319
0.320
County FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-by-year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Point estimates of coefficients 𝛿𝛿1 and 𝛿𝛿2 are summarized in column (1) for model
𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜸𝜸′ 𝑿𝑿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 .
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1 if at least three consecutive years are boom years in a spell i within a
county. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1 if at least three consecutive years are bust years in a spell i
within a county. Define a year as a boom (decline) year if the annual change of drilling
density is more (less) than 10 oil/gas wells per initial 1,000 labors. 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖
(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ) is the number of years that a boom (decline) spell i lasts.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 3 − 4 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1 if a spell i lasts for 3 or 4 years. Additional Controls
includes three sets of control variables the same as in the basic results. County clustered
standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5
percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level.
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